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Roy C. Snodgrass 111"
Patrick O'Daniel ***
I. CASE LAW
A. DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY
1. Business Judgment RuleJ N Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Brown I the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas held that the Texas business
judgment rule immunizes directors of banks located in Texas from liabil-
ity provided that the directors' actions are not self-interested, fraudulent,
beyond their authority, or grossly negligent. In Brown the court did not
consider 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k)2 stating that "12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) creates a
substantive standard of care, and therefore does not apply retroactively, the
court must look to the law as it existed at the time of the alleged acts and
omissions in this case .... ,,3 The court relied upon Cates v. Sparkman 4 as
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1. 812 F. Supp. 722 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
2. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),
12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. I 1989) provides:
A director or officer of an insured depository institution may be held personally
liable for monetary damages in any civil action by, on behalf of, or at the request
or direction of the Corporation, which action is prosecuted wholly or partially
for the benefit of the Corporation-
(1) acting as conservator or receiver of such institution,
(2) acting based upon a suit, claim, or cause of action purchased from, assigned
by, or otherwise conveyed by such receiver or conservator, or
(3) acting based upon a suit, claim, or cause of action purchased from, assigned
by, or otherwise conveyed in whole or in part by an insured depository insti-
tution or its affiliate in connection with assistance provided under section
1823 of this title, for gross negligence, including any similar conduct or con-
duct that demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty of care (than gross
negligence) including intention tortious conduct, as such terms are defined
and determined under applicable State law. Nothing in this paragraph shall
impair or affect any right of the Corporation under other applicable law.
Id.
3. Brown, 812 F. Supp. at 726.
4. 73 Tex. 619, 11 S.W. 846 (1889).
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the genesis for the business judgment rule. In Cates the Supreme Court of
Texas concluded that the negligence of a director, no matter how unwise or
imprudent, does not constitute a breach of duty if the acts of the director
were " 'within the exercise of their discretion and judgment in the develop-
ment or prosecution of the enterprise in which their interests are involved
.... " " Applying the reasoning in Cates, the court in Gearhart Industries v.
Smith International, Inc. 6 concluded that " '.... Texas courts to this day will
not impose liability upon a non-interested corporate director unless the chal-
lenged action is ultra vires or is tainted by fraud. . . . Such is the business
judgment rule in Texas.' "7 The court in Brown held that the business judg-
ment rule remains a viable doctrine in state courts with a viable rationale of
''encouraging citizens to serve as corporate directors by immunizing them
from acts and omissions that in hindsight proved to be wrong, as long as the
directors were not personally interested in the transaction or did not act
fraudulently or contrary to their lawful authority." 8 The court noted that
the business judgment rule protects actions that with the benefit of hindsight
could have been different stating that with "better or more current apprais-
als, more or better security for the loan .... almost any loan could have been
made more secure, or at least the bank could have suffered a smaller loss on
it." Further, the court stated that "[tihe business judgment rule protects
bank directors from being guarantors on loans made by banks" and "encour-
ages directors to exercise their judgment in making loans and not to fore-
close credit markets to all but blue-chip borrowers.''0
The court rejected two arguments by the FDIC that bank directors owe a
higher duty than non-bank directors. The FDIC argued that FDIC v.
Wheat I I established that the business judgment rule does not preclude an
action for negligence against disinterested directors of a bank. The court
distinguished Wheat in noting that Sudderth, the director found liable in
Wheat, had a personal interest in the transaction for which he was found
liable, whereas the defendant directors in this case had no such personal
interest. Further, the court noted that Sudderth did not argue on appeal
that he did not breach his duty of care of good faith because the business
judgment rule precluded liability for negligence under Texas law. Instead,
he argued only that he owed no duty because (1) there was no evidence of his
5. Brown, 812 F. Supp. at 724 (quoting Cates, 11 S.W. at 849).
6. 741 F.2d 707, 721 (5th Cir. 1984).
7. Brown, 812 F. Supp. at 724 (quoting Gearhart, 741 F.2d at 721). But see Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Hays, Civ. A. No. SA-92-CA-0653, 1992 WL 512414, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 2,
1992), where the court denied a Motion to Dismiss filed by an outside director alleging his
actions or omissions were protected by the business judgment rule. The court held such an
interpretation of Gearhart "would be tantamount to adopting a rule that the only duty owed
by the directors of a corporation to the corporation is the rather minimal duty of not commit-
ting fraud or ultra vires acts." Id.
8. Brown, 812 F. Supp. at 723. But see Hays at *21 where the court held that "[before
the business judgment rule even comes into play, the director has the obligation of showing
that he met his fiduciary duties." Id.
9. Brown, 812 F. Supp. at 723.
10. Id.
11. 970 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1992).
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knowledge of the loan in question and (2) he was no longer a director of the
bank when the loan closed. Finally, the court distinguished Wheat, noting
that the business judgment rule was discussed only in terms of whether the
jury charge was correct, not whether the FDIC's allegations of negligence
stated a claim. ' 2
In addition, the court rejected the FDIC's argument that the business
judgment rule shields directors and officers in suits by shareholders for their
own benefit, but not in suits on behalf of the corporation, stating that the
FDIC cited no authority for such a proposition.' 3 The court held that its
opinion in Holmes 14 was incorrect to the extent that it barred claims for
gross negligence against a disinterested corporate director. The court went
on to examine a number of cases in order to clarify the meaning of grossly
negligent conduct of a director.' 5
The court also held that the business judgment rule does not protect the
directors if they abdicated their responsibility and failed to exercise any
judgment. Relying on Joy v. North,16 the court stated that the business judg-
ment rule "does not apply in cases, e.g., in which the corporate decision
lacks a business purpose, is tainted by conflict of interest, is so egregious as
to amount to a no-win, decision or results from an obvious and prolonged
failure to exercise oversight or supervision."' 17 Thus, "[t]he business judg-
ment rule necessarily presumes that the directors exercised their
judgment."18
The court considered whether a federal standard of care should be im-
posed because RepublicBank - Houston was a national bank. Holding that
no federal standard of care was applicable, the court relied on FDIC v. Ernst
& Young 19 for the proposition that absent a specific statutory right, the
FDIC is to be treated like any other litigant. 20
Finally, the court ordered the FDIC to replead its complaint, noting that
the court could not tell whether the various duties allegedly breached were
based in tort or in contract and, if in tort, whether based on negligence, gross
negligence, or breach of fiduciary duty. The FDIC had alleged a non-ex-
haustive laundry list of directors' duties and breaches of those duties, com-
12. Brown, 812 F. Supp. at 725.
13. Id. at 724.
14. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Holmes, Civil Action No. H-92-0753 (S.D. Tex. April 10,
1992).
15. Cates v. Sparkman, 73 Tex. 619, 11 S.W. 846 (1889), did not expressly use the term
"gross negligence" but stated that "injurious practices, abuse of power, and oppression on the
part of the company or its controlling agency clearly subversive of the rights of the minority,
or of a shareholder" are not protected by the rule. Cates, II S.W. at 849. Burk Royalty
Company v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 920 (Tex. 1981), defined gross negligence as "an entire
want of care." In Jewel v. Sal-O-Dent Labs., Inc., 69 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1934, writ refd), the court contrasted acts "indicating reckless mismanagement, or
that the acts were not done, or authorized, in an honest exercise of the judgment of the board
of directors, and in the interest of the corporation." Jewel, 69 S.W.2d at 546.
16. 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
17. Brown, 812 F. Supp. at 726.
18. Id.
19. 967 F.2d 166, 169-70 (5th Cir. 1992).
20. Brown, 812 F. Supp. at 726.
1994]
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bining all of the duties and breaches together as justifying liability under all
four of its causes of action in its pleadings. The court ordered the FDIC to
replead, alleging specifically by defendant each act or omission, naming: (1)
the specific duty implicated and, if the duty is based on a contract, the pre-
cise contract, and the contract language that creates the duty; (2) how the
duty was breached; (3) when and how the duty first damaged the Republic
Bank - Houston for the amount of the damages; and (4) how the damages
were calculated. 2'
In Resolution Trust Corporation v. Norris22 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas expanded upon and followed its
earlier holding in Brown. In Norris the Resolution Trust Corporation (the
RTC) sued the former outside directors of Commonwealth Savings Associa-
tion (Commonwealth) alleging a breach of the duty of due care, negligence,
gross negligence, and negligence per se resulting in over $200 million in
losses to the thrift. 23 As in Brown, the court declined to retroactively apply
12 U.S.C. § 182 1(k), and the court relied on Gearhart24 for its holding that
non-interested corporate directors are protected by the Texas business judg-
ment rule unless their actions are fraudulent or ultra vires.
The RTC alleged that the directors' actions approving certain real estate
loans was ultra vires because the loans violated federal and state regulations
relating to the form and approach of the appraisals used to support the loan
applications. The RTC argued that state and federal regulatory agencies
had issued Reports of Examination that criticized certain loan and under-
writing practices at Commonwealth, including the use of inadequate or de-
fective appraisals. The RTC argued that the approval of the loans by the
defendants constituted ultra vires acts because the defendants had ignored
warnings from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Texas Savings
and Loan Department "by failing to put into place proper review and lend-
ing procedures, and by ratifying loans that did not comply with state and
federal regulations and Commonwealth's Bylaws." 25 The court noted that
ultra vires acts are defined by Texas law as "acts beyond the scope of the
powers of a corporation as defined by its charter or the laws of the state of
incorporation. '' 26 Relying on Briggs v. Spaulding27 and Fitzpatrick v.
FDIC,28 the court noted that no allegation that directors knowingly commit-
ted illegal acts or acts outside their authority was made by the RTC. The
court stated that "[t]he failure to monitor the acts of the loan officers and
other individuals charged with preparing loans and presenting them to the
Board for approval is not an ultra vires act such that directors may be held
21. Id. at 727.
22. 830 F. Supp. 351 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
23. Id. at 354.
24. 741 F.2d at 721.
25. Norris, 830 F. Supp. at 355.
26. Id. at 357 (citing Gearhart, 741 F.2d at 719; Staacke v. Routledge, 111 Tex. 489, 241
S.W. 994, 998-99 (1922)).
27. 141 U.S. 132 (1891).
28. 765 F.2d 569, 577 (6th Cir. 1985).
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personally liable for the results."'29
The court also considered the RTC's claim that the defendants had
breached a duty of loyalty to Commonwealth. The RTC argued that the
directors were "interested" in the loan transactions because they tried "to
conceal the institution's financial condition from the regulators in order to
forestall regulatory intervention and maintain control of Commonwealth." 30
The RTC also argued that because the directors were acting to keep their
jobs, they were "interested directors." Relying on the definition of an inter-
ested director as set forth in Gearhart,31 the court noted that the defendant
directors did not fit in any of these categories and dismissed the claim for a
breach of duty of loyalty due to a desire to "entrench themselves" as direc-
tors of Commonwealth.
2. Affirmative Defenses
In Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Niblo 32 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas reviewed a number of affirmative
defenses asserted by defendant directors. The defendants were directors of
Texas Bank and Trust Company, Sweetwater, Texas (TBT) which was
placed in liquidation on July 27, 1989. The FDIC was appointed as receiver
of TBT at that time. The FDIC in its corporate capacity33 brought an ac-
tion against certain officers and directors of TBT alleging, among other
things, negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. The complaint alleges that
the officers and directors committed certain acts and-or failed to take certain
actions that led to losses of at least $3 million in connection with six loan
transactions. Applying Texas law except in areas where Texas law was
clearly preempted by federal laws,34 the court reviewed numerous affirma-
tive defenses asserted by the defendants.
The court examined the affirmative defense of waiver relying on First In-
terstate Bank of Arizona, N.A. v. Interfund Corp.,35 for the definition of
waiver as "the voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or
intentional conduct inconsistent with claiming that right."' 36 The FDIC ar-
29. Norris, 830 F. Supp. at 357.
30. Id. at 358.
31. The Gearhart court stated:
A director is considered "interested" if he or she (1) makes a personal profit
from a transaction by dealing with the corporation or usurps a corporate oppor-
tunity .... (2) buys or sells assets of the corporation .... (3) transacts business in
his director's capacity with a second corporation of which he is also a director or
significantly financially associated .... or (4) transacts business in his director's
capacity with a family member.
Gearhart, 741 F.2d at 719-20 (citations omitted).
32. 821 F. Supp. 441 (N.D. Tex. 1993).
33. The FDIC conducts its business in several different capacities: FDIC-Corporation
acts as an insurer, regulator, and-or liquidator of assets purchased or assigned from FDIC-
Receiver; FDIC-Receiver acts as receiver of any failed institution for which it has been ap-
pointed receiver for the purposes of liquidation or winding-up the affairs of an insured institu-
tion, or for arranging a purchase and assumption transaction. Niblo, 821 F. Supp. at 449.
34. Id. at 449 n.14.
35. 924 F.2d 588, 595 (5th Cir. 1991).
36. Niblo, 821 F. Supp. at 451.
1994]
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gued that the defense of waiver was insufficient as a matter of law because it
called into question the conduct of the FDIC.37 Further, the FDIC argued
that the affirmative defense of waiver should be stricken because the FDIC
owed no duty to the defendants. The court rejected this argument, refusing
to strike the affirmative- defense of waiver stating "[w]aiver does not rest
upon any duty owed to the other party, but rather a party's duty to itself to
act upon or lose a specific right."'38
Relying on Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford County,
Inc.,39 the court declined to strike the affirmative defense estoppel. The
court, however, noted that " 'a party seeking to estop the government bears
a quite heavy burden'; in addition to establishing the four elements of estop-
pel ... the party [must] 'allege more than mere negligence, delay, inaction,
or failure to follow an internal agency guideline.' "4
The court rejected the FDIC's argument that the affirmative defense of
failure to mitigate damages should be stricken because it was insufficient as a
matter of law. The court relied upon Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. ,41
stating:
[w]hile it is commonly said that an injured party has a 'duty' to mini-
mize damages, this is a misnomer, for the victim owes no duty to the
person who hurts him. The principal, correctly stated, is that the in-
jured person may not recover damages that do not result proximately
from the defendant's breach of duty. Damages that might be avoided or
mitigated are, therefore, not recoverable. 42
The court reasoned that "a plaintiffs duty to mitigate its damages is owed to
itself if that plaintiff desires to have full satisfaction of its damages," 43 and
the court therefore allowed the affirmative defense of mitigation of damages.
The court also considered whether the Texas rule of comparative responsi-
bility providing "[i]n an action in which a claimant seeks damages for harm
other than personal injury, property damage, or death, arising out of any
action grounded in negligence .... a claimant may recover damages only if
his percentage of responsibility is less than or equal to 50 percent" 44 was
applicable in this case. The court drew a distinction between the actions of
FDIC-Corporate and FDIC-Receiver noting that they are separate entities
and cannot be held accountable for the actions of the other.45 The court
held that as a result of the FDIC-Receiver and FDIC-Corporate being sepa-
rate entities, the defendant would only be able to examine the actions of
FDIC-Corporate after it acquired the present cause of action and the loans
37. Id. at 451-52 (citing FDIC v. Isham, 782 F. Supp. 524, 532 (D. Colo. 1992); FDIC v.
Crosby, 774 F. Supp. 584 (W.D. Wash. 1991)).
38. Niblo, 821 F. Supp. at 452.
39. 467 U.S. 51, 59 (1984).
40. Mangaroo v. Nelson, 864 F.2d 1202, 1204-05 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Fano v.
O'Neill, 806 F.2d 1262, 1265 (5th Cir. 1987)).
41. 761 F.2d 1129, 1139 (5th Cir. 1985).
42. Niblo, 821 F. Supp. at 453.
43. Id. at 453.
44. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 33.001 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
45. See FDIC v. Condit, 861 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1988).
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related thereto; the defendants, however, were precluded from asserting the
defense of comparative responsibility to the extent they sought to examine
the conduct of the FDIC in its capacities as insurer, regulator, receiver, or
liquidator of TBT. The court noted that FDIC-Corporate's conduct seemed
to be more related to issues of proximate causation of the loss and mitigation
of damages, and that it would be subject to examination under the affirma-
tive defenses of mitigation of damages or no proximate causation.46
The court also allowed the business judgment rule to be asserted as an
affirmative defense. Relying on FDIC v. Wheat,47 the court stated that the
business judgment rule for banks provides that:
a director or officer of a bank shall not be liable for claims against him
if, in the discharge of his duties, he exercised ordinary care and acted in
good faith and honestly exercised his best business judgment within the
limits of the actual authority of his position with the bank. A director
or officer of a bank shall not be held liable for honest mistake of judg-
ment if he acted with due care, in good faith, and in furtherance of a
rational business purpose.48
The court also allowed the affirmative defense that the FDIC should have
removed officers and directors for engaging in unsafe and unsound practices
under 12 U.S.C. § 1818(d)(1)(ii), (iii). 49 The court noted that the statute
does not impose a duty on the FDIC to remove directors in such circum-
stances, but the court indicated that the defendants may show that the FDIC
abused its discretion in not exercising its right to remove directors and
officers. 50
3. Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance
a. Regulatory Exclusion
In Bartley v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh5' the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas examined
the scope of the insurance coverage of the former officers and directors of
First RepublicBank-Dallas and First RepublicBank-Houston. In Bartley
the FDIC sued former officers and directors of the First RepublicBanks lo-
cated in Dallas and Houston for negligence and breaches of their common
law and statutory duties as officers and directors. The plaintiff directors and
officers brought an action seeking declaratory judgment regarding the cover-
age obligations of National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh
(National Union) under an officers' and directors' liability insurance policy
and a Binder that superseded the policy (the Binder). The plaintiffs claimed
that they were insureds under the National Union policy that became effec-
tive on June 6, 1987 and expired on June 6, 1988 (the Policy or the Year One
Policy) and a Binder for a policy to be effective in 1988 and 1989. The
46. Niblo, 821 F. Supp. at 456.
47. 970 F.2d 124, 130-31 n.13 (5th Cir. 1992).
48. Niblo, 821 F. Supp. at 458 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1818(d)(1)(ii) & (iii) (Supp. 1 1989).
49. Id. at 461.
50. Niblo, 821 F. Supp. at 461.
51. 824 F. Supp. 624 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
1994]
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Binder became effective on June 6, 1988. On June 23, 1989, while the Binder
was still in effect, the officers and directors received notice that the FDIC
would bring claims against them. The plaintiffs then forwarded this notice
to National Union, which denied that the claims brought by the FDIC were
covered by the policies. The plaintiffs alleged: (1) a breach of contract claim
against National Union for its failure to provide coverage for the claims
brought by the FDIC; (2) a declaratory judgment action seeking a declara-
tion that, under the National Union policies, plaintiffs have the right to cov-
erage for the FDIC's claims and the cost of defending such claim; (3)
National Union breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing and was
grossly negligent; and (4) National Union violated article 21.21 of the Texas
Insurance Code. 52
The endorsement to the Year One Policy specifically excluded coverage
for suits brought by regulatory agencies such as the FDIC.53 National
Union contended that the plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a claim because
the Binder and the Year One Policy were both subject to the regulatory
exclusion contained in the endorsement to the Year One Policy. The plain-
tiffs argued that the Binder did not incorporate the terms of the endorsement
contained in the regulatory exclusion.
The Binder referred to the "policy as expiring" and National Union ar-
gued that such language referred to the entire Year One Policy, not just the
forms that made up the policy without its endorsements. Applying Texas
law concerning the interpretation of contracts, the court noted "[i]n constru-
ing a written contract, the primary concern of the court is to ascertain the
true intentions of the parties as expressed in the instrument. ' 54 Following
the general rule that "[o]rdinarily, all parts of the contract are to be taken
together, and such meaning shall be given to them as will carry out and
effectuate to the fullest extent the intention of the parties," 55 the court re-
viewed the language of the entire contract and held that the phrase "policy
as expiring" refers to the entire Year One Policy, including the endorse-
ments. 56 Therefore, the regulatory exclusion was applicable.
The plaintiffs also contended that the regulatory exclusion was ambiguous
alleging that the phrase "based upon or attributable to any action or pro-
ceeding brought by or on behalf of the [FDIC]' 57 could reasonably be con-
52. Bartley, 824 F. Supp. at 628.
53. The Endorsement provided:
In consideration of the premium charged, it is hereby understood and agreed
that the insurer shall NOT be liable to make any payment for loss in connection
with any claim based upon or attributable to any action or proceeding brought
by or on behalf of the [FDIC], including any type of legal action which [the
FDIC has] the legal right to bring as receiver, conservator, liquidator or other-
wise; whether such action or proceeding is brought in the name of [the FDIC] or
by or on behalf of [the FDIC] in the name of any other entity or solely in the
name of any Third Party.
Id. at 629.
54. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983).
55. General Indem. Co. v. Pepper, 161 Tex. 263, 339 S.W.2d 660, 661 (1960).
56. Bartley, 824 F. Supp. at 631.
57. Id. at 632.
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strued to apply only to claims asserted by the FDIC against third parties and
not to claims asserted by the FDIC directly against the officers and directors
of an institution. The court relied on St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co.
v. FDIC 58 where it was held that an identical regulatory exclusion that ex-
cluded coverage "based upon or attributable to any action or proceeding
brought by or on behalf of the [FDIC]" 59 was unambiguous. The court in
St. Paul Fire noted that the insurer's "intent to preclude [coverage for] all
suits brought by the FDIC could not be stated in more explicit language
.... -60 The court also cited Gary v. American Casualty Co. 6 1 and FDIC v.
American Casualty 62 as cases finding language that was identical or very
similar to the language at issue to be unambiguous. Thus, the court con-
cluded that the regulatory exclusion excluded National Union's liability for
the type of claims for which the plaintiffs sought coverage.
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the regulatory exclu-
sion was contrary to public policy relying on the Fifth Circuit's recent deci-
sion in Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland v. Conner.63 The court
noted that the plaintiffs' argument that the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 198 9 64 "provides a dominant public pol-
icy which would justify voiding the regulatory exclusion on public policy
grounds was [previously] rejected by the Fifth Circuit."'6 5
The court then discussed the plaintiffs' claim that the application of the
regulatory endorsement would effect an unconscionable result. Relying on
the test set forth in Wade v. Austin,66 the court stated
two types of abuses must generally be present to produce a finding of
unconscionability. First, plaintiffs must show "procedural abuse" in
the formation of the contract, such as a gross disparity in bargaining
ability. . . . Second, [plaintiffs] must also demonstrate "substantive
abuse," or unfairness in the formal terms of the contract. 67
In order to demonstrate substantive unconscionability, the plaintiffs had the
burden of showing that the terms of their contract with National Union were
plainly oppressive. The court held that the plaintiffs did not meet this bur-
den finding that "the regulatory exclusion appears to be merely an allocation
of the risk agreed to by two commercial entities .... [and] that the exclusion
was 'voluntarily entered into, and [was] not the result of mistake, fraud, or
oppression.' "68
Plaintiffs then argued that the doctrine of reasonable expectations should
58. 765 F. Supp. 538 (D. Minn. 1991).
59. Bartley, 824 F. Supp. at 633 (quoting St. Paul Fire, 765 F. Supp. at 541).
60. St. Paul Fire, 765 F. Supp at 549.
61. 753 F. Supp. 1547, 1550-51 (W.D. Okla. 1990).
62. 975 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1992).
63. 973 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1992); see FDIC v. American Casualty, 975 F.2d 677 (10th
Cir. 1992); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 968 F.2d 695, 702 (8th Cir. 1992).
64. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1833(e) (Supp. 1 1989).
65. Bartley, 824 F. Supp. at 634.
66. 524 S.W.2d 79, 86 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, no writ).




be applicable. This doctrine provides that the objectively reasonable expec-
tations of insureds should be honored "'even though painstaking study of
the policy provisions would have negated those expectations.' ",69 Relying
on Forbau v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.,7° the court rejected the plaintiffs'
argument noting that "the reasonable expectations doctrine is premised
upon the presence of an ambiguity in the contract in question; it is not avail-
able in the face of an unambiguous contract such as the one at issue in the
present case." '7 1
b. Notice of Claim
In McCullough v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.72 the Fifth Circuit reviewed
whether adequate notice had been given to Fidelity and Deposit Company of
Maryland (F&D) to trigger coverage under a "claims made" insurance pol-
icy. In McCullough, F&D issued four directors' and officers' (D and 0)
liability policies to four affiliate banks and to three subsidiary banks of Har-
ris County Bancshares, Inc. The policies covered claims made against in-
sured officers and directors if the required notice was given to the insurer
during the policy period. Section 6(a) expanded the coverage to cover claims
made after the expiration of the policy term if certain written notice of the
potential claims was given to F&D during the policy period. Section 6 of the
policy provided:
(a) [i]f during the policy period, or during the extended discovery pe-
riod if the right is exercised by the Bank or the Directors and Officers in
accordance with Clause 2, the Bank or the Directors and Officers shall:
... (2) become aware of any act, error, or omission which may subse-
quently give rise to a claim being made against the Directors and Of-
ficers, or any of them, for a specified Wrongful Act; and shall during
such period give written notice thereof to the Company as soon as prac-
ticable and prior to the date of termination of the policy, then any claim
which may subsequently be made against the Directors and Officers
arising out of such Wrongful Act shall, for the purpose of this policy, be
treated as a claim made during the Policy Year or the extended discov-
ery period in which such notice was first given. 73
F&D contended that this language required the bank to notify it of "speci-
fied Wrongful Acts" of Directors and Officers having claim potential. 74 The
plaintiff argued that the notice can be in the broader form of "any act, error
or omission" which may give rise to a claim for specified wrongful acts. 71
Reviewing the plain language of the policy, the court held that F&D's read-
ing of the language was correct.
The court then reviewed whether actions taken by the bank constituted
69. Id. at 635-36 (citing Rodman v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 208 N.W.2d 903, 906
(Iowa 1973)).
70. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 140, 1993 WL 141397 (May 5, 1993).
71. Bartley, 824 F. Supp. at 636 (citing Forbau, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 143 n.8, 144).
72. 2 F.3d 110 (5th Cir. 1993).
73. McCullough, 2 F.3d at 111.




notice of specified wrongful acts in accordance with the policy provisions.
During the policy period, the banks provided F&D with quarterly reports of
financial condition that described increasing loan losses and delinquencies.
Further, the banks provided F&D with a 1984 annual report in conjunction
with the renewal of their policies in 1985. The annual report contained a
footnote which referred to the issuance of a cease and desist order to one of
the subsidiary banks by its primary regulator, the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (the OCC). The bank, however, did not send the cease and
desist order itself. In addition, F&D expressed concern about the bank's
"*problem with the Feds' 76 in correspondence between F&D and the bank,
and F&D informed the banks that it intended to cancel their policies
midterm, effective October 9, 1985.
The plaintiff contended that F&D was put on notice of acts or omissions
of directors and officers which could later give rise to claims for specified
wrongful acts by the reference to the cease and desist order in the annual
report and the further reports of the banks' deteriorating financial condition.
Further, the plaintiff argued that the term "wrongful act" in the policy in-
cluded a breach of duty and the information furnished to F&D was adequate
to inform it that the insured officers and directors had breached their duty to
properly supervise the bank's lending operations. The court rejected these
arguments holding that even if it is assumed that
notice of the issuance of the cease and desist order informs the insurer
that the bank is having some difficulty, the issuance of such an order
does not identify specified wrongful acts. The banks gave F&D no no-
tice of the particular subsidiary involved, the particular agents, officers
or directors involved, the time period during which the events occurred,
the identity of potential claimants, and the specific unsound practices
77
Relying on American Casualty Co. v. FDIC78 and California Union Insur-
ance Co. v. American Diversified Savings Bank,79 the court held that notice
of an institution's worsening financial condition does not constitute notice of
an officer's or director's act, error or omission. Further, it was held that
rising delinquencies in bad loan portfolios are insufficient to constitute notice
of specified wrongful acts.
c. Termination of Insurance Coverage Upon Takeover
In United States Fire Insurance Co. v. FDIC 80 the Fifth Circuit reviewed
whether a savings and loan which placed itself under voluntary supervisory
control by the Texas Savings and Loan Commission constituted a "take-
over" of a savings and loan for purposes of termination of the savings and
loan's insurance coverage under Savings and Loan Blanket Bond Standard
Form No. 22 (Form 22).
76. Id. at 111.
77. Id. at 113.
78. 944 F.2d 455, 460 (8th Cir. 1991).
79. 914 F.2d 1271, 1277-78 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1088 (1991).
80. 981 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1993).
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Empire Savings and Loan Association (Empire), a Texas chartered sav-
ings and loan and its predecessor, Town East Savings and Loan Association,
purchased a Form 22 Blanket Bond from the United States Fire Insurance
Company (U.S. Fire) which became effective on August 5, 1978. The provi-
sions of the Bond provided that the Bond would automatically terminate
"immediately upon the taking over of the Insured by a receiver or other
liquidator or by State or Federal Officials." 8' Empire began to face problems
due to questionable lending practices in the early 1980s and received a tem-
porary cease and desist order from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in
1983. On January 9, 1984, the Texas Savings and Loan Commission issued
a cease and desist order. Upon the issuance of such order, Empire placed
itself under voluntary supervisory control by the Texas Savings and Loan
Commission. Sometime after January 9, 1984, actions by Empire employees
that might have supported claims under the Bond were discovered. U.S.
Fire contended that the claims were not covered under the Bond because
they were not discovered prior to the takeover on January 9, 1984. The
FDIC argued that the term "taking over" is ambiguous and that section
11 (c) of the Bond under which the Bond was terminated, was unenforceable
because it was contrary to federal law and violated public policy. In addi-
tion, the FDIC contended that a takeover did not occur within the meaning
of section 11(c).
Relying on Sharp v. FSLIC,8 2 the court rejected the FDIC's arguments
regarding public policy, enforceability of section 1 1(c) and ambiguity by
stating that Sharp "makes clear that a takeover does not have to be in the
form of a receivership or liquidation, but occurs at any time the government
assumes control over a thrift institution. ' 8 3 The court held that a taking
over had occurred because Empire was prohibited by the supervisory take-
over from engaging in activities that are the core functions of a savings and
loan such as lending or investing any of its funds, withdrawing any bank
accounts, encumbering any assets or incurring any debt including accepting
deposits without approval. The court stated "[w]e are not concerned with
the manner in which the order was implemented in determining the applica-
tion of § 11, but rather its effect. The Bond's termination provision does not
require a 'hostile' or 'involuntary' taking over but merely requires a 'taking
over,' regardless of whether it be by consent or by force of law."18 4
The court also noted that had there been any ambiguity in the language of
the Bond, it should not be construed against U.S. Fire because the Bond was
drafted jointly by the American Banker's Association and the American
Surety Association, not by U.S. Fire.
81. US. Fire Ins. Co., 981 F.2d at 850.
82. 858 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1988).
83. US. Fire Ins. Co., 981 F.2d at 851 (citing Sharp, 858 F.2d at 1045).




1. Measure of Damages
In Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Thompson & Knight 85 the United
States District Court of the Northern District of Texas ruled on a summary
judgment motion that the FDIC could not recover from a law firm and one
of its lawyers for legal malpractice. The action arose out of activities alleged
to occur from January 1982 until October 14, 1988 in relation to Olney Sav-
ings Association (OSA) and its wholly owned subsidiaries, Olney Mortgage
Resources (OMR) and Olney Service Corporation (OSC). OSA was a state
chartered, federally insured savings association. OMR and OSC were pri-
vate corporations. On October 14, 1988, the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (the FHLBB) declared OSA insolvent and appointed the Federal Sav-
ings Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) as receiver (FSLIC/Receiver) for
OSA. By operation of law, OSA's assets and liabilities were transferred to
FSLIC/Receiver and FSLIC/Receiver succeeded to the rights, titles, powers
and privileges of OSA, its members, directors and officers.86 On that same
date, an acquisition agreement between FSLIC/Receiver and NuOlney Sav-
ings Association (AmWest) transferring almost all of OSA's assets to
AmWest was entered into between the FSLIC/Receiver and AmWest. The
loans and collateral at issue in this case and the stock of OSC and OMR
were included in the assets transferred to AmWest pursuant to the acquisi-
tion agreement. FSLIC/Receiver retained only certain office leases, furni-
ture, fixtures, equipment, and specified claims against former officers,
directors, shareholders and attorneys and agents of OSA. In addition to the
acquisition agreement, a separate receiver's agreement was entered into on
October 14, 1988 between FSLIC/Receiver and FSLIC in its corporate ca-
pacity. The receiver's agreement conveyed the assets that FSLIC/Receiver
had retained to FSLIC/Corporate. Therefore, FSLIC/Receiver was left
without any assets. In addition, an assistance agreement between the FSLIC
and AmWest entered into on October 14, 1988 provided that the FSLIC in
its corporate capacity would provide financial assistance and indemnification
as to certain "covered" assets acquired by AmWest.
The FHLBB and the FSLIC were abolished pursuant to the provisions of
FIRREA upon its enactment in August 1989 and the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation Resolution Fund (the Fund) managed by the
FDIC, was created. All assets of the FSLIC, including those assets the
FSLIC/Receiver had transferred to the FSLIC by the receiver's agreement,
were transferred to the Fund. The FDIC then filed the action against
Thompson & Knight, a law firm, Rose (an attorney at Thompson and
Knight), certain former directors of OSA, a former officer and director of
OMR and OSC, former shareholders of OSA, Myers Financial Corporation
(MFC), the successor to Myers Development Corporation (MDC) and
85. 816 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. Tex. 1993).




Michael A. Myers (Myers), an individual who controlled MFC and MDC
and was involved in certain transactions with OSA, OSC and OMR. While
the court gave no details on the charges, they allege in part that transactions
among OSA, its subsidiaries, Myers and his corporation were so favorable to
Myers, and so unfavorable to OSA, that OSA bore virtually all the risks
while Myers stood to make nearly all the gains. It was also alleged that Rose
understood and assisted in the transactions, and overlooked legal violations
in their execution.8 7 The FDIC alleged that the negligence and wrongful
acts of the defendants caused damage to OSA and its subsidiaries in excess of
$50,000,000.88 A motion for summary judgment was brought claiming that
neither the FDIC nor its predecessors had suffered any damages. It was
undisputed in the motion that the FSLIC/FDIC has paid out approximately
$40,000,000 to AmWest under the assistance agreement on transactions re-
lated to the FDIC's action to recover against the defendants. Further, the
FDIC alleged that before the failure of OSA, OSA lost at least $8,000,000 on
the transactions at issue.8 9
The court relied upon the measure of damage rule expressed in Corsicana
National Bank v. Johnson90 concluding that no recovery for losses on the
loans in question can be had by OSA, FSLIC/Receiver or the ultimate as-
signee of either of them. The measure of damage rule in Corsicana states:
[T]he cause of action against [the wrongdoing director] accrued . . .
when the Bank through his act parted with the money loaned, receiving
in return only negotiable paper that it could not lawfully accept because
the transaction was prohibited by § 5200, Rev. Stats. The damage as
well as the injury was complete at that time, and the Bank was not
obliged to await the maturity of the notes, because immediately it be-
came the duty of the officers or directors who knowingly participated in
making the excessive loan to undue the wrong done by taking the notes
off the hands of the Bank and restoring to it the money that had been
loaned. Of course, whatever of value the Bank recovered from the bor-
rowers on account of the loan would go in diminution of the damages
[Ilt is plain that the transaction of February 12, 1908, in which the
Bank sold the Fleming and Templeton notes and indebtedness to the
loan company for their full face value, was prima facie tantamount to a
satisfaction of the damages the Bank had sustained by reason of the
excessive loan . . . . Had the disposition made of them in February,
1908, been valid and unassailable, it would have borne the appearance
of a satisfaction of the damages only because the two corporations were
legally separate .... 91 The court explained that the proper reading of
Corsicana: is that if a lending institution, or someone acting for it,
transfers an illegally made loan in exchange for its full face value, the
87. 3 BANK BAIL OUT LITIG. NEWS 3 (1993).
88. FDIC v. Thompson & Knight, 816 F. Supp. at 1125.
89. 3 BANK BAIL OUT LITIG. NEWS 3 (1993).
90. 251 U.S. 68 (1919).
91. Thompson & Knight, 816 F. Supp. at 1130 (citing Corsicana, 251 U.S. at 86-87).
[Vol. 47
BANKING LAW
risk of loss related to the loan has been removed from the lending insti-
tution and has been placed with the transferee, AmWest in this case.
This is another way to say that when such a transfer occurs, the losses
that apparently existed at the time the loan was made are eliminated;
and, whatever damages would otherwise be measured by those losses
are satisfied by the transfer.
The court relied on summary judgment evidence provided by the affidavit
of William R. Welch, CPA (Welch) which was filed as a part of the FDIC's
motion for leave to file a supplemental affidavit in opposition to the motion
for summary judgment.92 In his affidavit, Welch treats the allocation of the
purchase price for the assets acquired by AmWest pursuant to the acquisi-
tion agreement to be the equivalent of "book value" of the loans, which he
defined to be "the loan's principal balance plus any accrued but unpaid inter-
est."'93 Applying Corsicana to these facts, the court stated,
if Welch is correct on that subject (and there is nothing in the summary
judgment record to indicate that he is not), then under the rules ex-
pressed by the Supreme Court in Corsicana on the subject of measure of
damages, there would be no damages as to the loans in question because
OSA, through FSLIC/receiver, would have received "their full face
value" in exchange for their transfer to AmWest.
The court found it irrelevant that the assistance agreement was part of the
overall deal between AmWest and the FSLIC/Receiver. The court quoted
Welch's testimony several times for the proposition that all risk of loss on
the loans transferred by FSLIC/Receiver is to be borne by AmWest in the
absence of the assistance agreement. The court also indicated that the FDIC
partially concurred with this analysis stating that "in a telephone conference
between the court and counsel on March 3, 1993, counsel for FDIC con-
firmed that FDIC is not asserting in this action any claim derivative through
the assistance agreement."'94 Relying on FDIC v. Ernst and Young, 95 the
court held that the FDIC as assignee has no greater or different rights than
its assignor. Thus, the FDIC was not entitled to recover for losses that
neither OSA nor OSA's receiver suffered.
The court also noted that the FDIC could not assert claims against
Thompson & Knight or Rose for legal malpractice in any capacity other
than as the ultimate assignee of OSA's receiver. The court stated that
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1131.
94. Id. at 1126. The following exchange occurred between the court and counsel for
FDIC during the March 3 telephone conference:
THE COURT: I am not asking you to disclose any secrets that you would
prefer not to disclose, but has FDIC accepted the proposition that it is not going
to be able to recover in this lawsuit payments it made by virtue of obligations it
assumed under the Assistance Agreement?
MR. GENTRY: Yes, Your Honor, I believe that is correct.
THE COURT: So that's really not an impediment to the negotiations, some
notion that they can recover under that?
MR. GENTRY: No, Your Honor.
Id. at 1126 n.3.
95. 967 F.2d 166, 169-70 (5th Cir. 1992).
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"[u]nder Texas law, persons outside the attorney-client relationship have no
cause of action for legal malpractice." '96 Holding that no independent duty
was owed by Thompson & Knight and Rose to the FSLIC, FDIC or
AmWest, the court held that "any loss suffered by FSLIC, FDIC, or
AmWest cannot be charged against [Thompson & Knight] or Rose."'97
C. ENFORCEMENT OF LIENS
1. Relinquishment of Security Interest
In Amarillo National Bank v. Komatsu Zenoah America, Inc.98 the court
determined under what circumstances a bank relinquishes its security inter-
est in a debtor's collateral as a result of the debtor transferring the collateral
to a third party. In Komatsu the Amarillo National Bank (the Bank) re-
ceived two notes from Connally Implement & Supply Co., Inc. (CISCO)
secured by a written security agreement in "all inventory, accounts, notes,
proceeds, [and] goods" owned by CISCO.99 The agreement also provided
that the debtor would not remove any specified collateral "except goods iden-
tified herein as inventory."'' ° CISCO purchased on credit certain inventory
items from Komatsu. After the Bank had perfected its security interest in
CISCO's inventory, CISCO returned the items to Komatsu in partial satis-
faction of CISCO's debt to Komatsu. Komatsu did not perfect its purchase
money security interest in the property. Subsequently, the Bank sued Ko-
matsu for conversion but the district court ruled that the Bank had relin-
quished its security interest in the items by authorizing their transfer, and
granted Komatsu's summary judgment motion. The Fifth Circuit
reversed.' 0
It determined that the Bank's security interest survived the transfer if the
transfer was made without the bank's consent. 10 2 The court rejected Ko-
matsu's argument that the clause excepting inventory from the general pro-
hibition of unauthorized transfers meant that the Bank authorized Cisco's
transfer to Komatsu. 0 3 The court found that Komatsu's argument would
be correct only if CISCO had transferred "inventory" to Komatsu. The dis-
trict court had found that this was the case based on the definition of "inven-
tory" in Black's Law Dictionary, but the appellate court held that Black's
was inapplicable because the security agreement provided that definitions in
the U.C.C. were to apply.1° 4 For defining "inventory," the court relied on
Official Comment 3 to section 9.109 of the U.C.C. which stated: "The prin-
96. Thompson & Knight, 816 F. Supp. at 1128.
97. Id. at 1129.
98. 991 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1993).
99. Id. at 274.
100. Id. at 275. The full clause read: "Debtor will not (without Bank's consent): remove
the collateral from the location specified herein; allow the collateral to become an accession to
other goods; sell, lease otherwise transfer, manufacture, process, assemble, or further under
contracts of service, the collateral, except goods identified herein as inventory." Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 9.306(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991)).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 275-76.
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cipal test to determine whether goods are inventory is that they are held for
immediate or ultimate sale. Implicit in the definition is the criterion that the
prospective sale is in the ordinary course of business."'0 5 Here, the transfer
was in partial satisfaction of CISCO's money debt to Komatsu and thus
under the U.C.C.'s definition, the transfer was not in "the ordinary course of
business."' 0 6 Therefore, the Bank did not authorize the transfer. 10 7 As a
result, the Bank had a valid conversion claim.
2. Sufficiency of Security Agreement
a. Possession and Purchase Money Security Interests
A purchase money security interest (PMSI) arises in equipment when the
seller of equipment also finances the sale and perfects a security interest in
the equipment. A PMSI that "is perfected at the time the debtor takes pos-
session of the collateral or within twenty (20) days thereafter" takes priority
over an earlier perfected security interest.' 0 8 In a case determining the defi-
nition of "possession" for purposes of section 9.312(d) of the Texas Uniform
Commercial Code, the Texas Supreme Court greatly strengthened the prior-
ity rights of a holder of an "after acquired property" security interest relative
to a holder of a PMSI.109 In Cockrell the court was asked to determine
when "possession" occurs; the court answered, sensibly enough, that posses-
sion occurs when the purchaser/debtor has control over the property, irre-
spective of whether such control is exclusive. I0
In Cockrell, John H. Cockrell, Jr. (Cockrell) owned a mini-blind factory
operating out of a leased warehouse. On August 1, 1985, he contracted to
sell the business and all of its assets to Kevin and Richard Sydnor (collec-
tively, the Sydnors) for $5,000 cash and a $130,000 note secured by the as-
sets of the business. Prior to this time, the Sydnors had executed a $40,000
promissory note with the Bank of Denton which was backed by a security
interest in all equipment then owned or subsequently acquired by the
Sydnors. On the same day as the sale, the Sydnors occupied the warehouse
and began operating the business. Cockrell also continued to occupy the
warehouse and assist the Sydnors in running the business until October 3,
1985, when he vacated the premises and handed his keys to the Sydnors.
Cockrell perfected his PMSI in the premises on October 20, 1985. The
Sydnors subsequently defaulted on their note to the Bank which seized and
sold all the equipment. Cockrell brought suit, claiming that since his secur-
ity interest had priority, the bank's foreclosure and sale amounted to
conversion.
105. Id. at 276.
106. Id. at 276-77. See also Permian Petroleum Co. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 934 F.2d 635,
648 (5th Cir. 1991) (explaining that under § 1.201(9), one who transfers goods in total or
partial satisfaction of a money debt is not a buyer in the ordinary course of business).
107. Id. at 277.
108. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.312(d) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991) (emphasis
added).
109. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Denton v. Cockrell, 850 S.W.2d 462 (Tex. 1993).
110. Id. at 466.
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The trial court ultimately found in the bank's favor but was reversed by
the appellate court, which concluded that possession under section 9.312(d)
only refers to "power over property exercisable to the exclusion of all other
persons."III Under this definition, the Sydnors did not have exclusive con-
trol over the property until Cockrell vacated the premises on October 3,
1985. Therefore, his PMSI was perfected within the twenty-day period and
trumped the bank's security interest.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. It reasoned that
the U.C.C. drafters' choice to have the purchase-money priority rule turn on
the definition of possession indicated "a desire that the commencement of
the grace period be easily ascertainable."' 12 This desire would be thwarted if
the definition of possession required exclusive control, because then it would
acquire "a meaning different from the simple physical control that to outside
parties suggests ownership rights."" 3 The court pointed out that the
Sydnors were using the warehouse as their place of business and, to an
outside creditor, it would appear that they had possession of the equipment
because they had physical control over it. The court suggested that to re-
quire exclusive control would place an undue burden on a secured creditor
who would have to verify that no other parties had access to the equipment.
Therefore, the Sydnors obtained possession when they occupied the premises
and began using the equipment on August 1, 1985. The court concluded
that since Cockrell did not attempt to perfect his interest until October 7,
1985-more than twenty days after possession occurred-the bank's prior
security interest had priority over Cockrell's interest.' '4
b. After-Acquired Property Security Interests and Intangible Property
In Orix Credit Alliance v. Omnibank' '1 the Houston Court of Appeals had
to determine the priority for security interests held by two different credi-
tors. One creditor, Orix Credit Alliance (Orix), received from the debtor an
after-acquired property security interest which covered "all other goods,
chattels, machinery, equipment, inventory, accounts, chattel paper, notes re-
ceivable, accounts receivable, furniture, fixtures and property of every kind
and nature, wherever located, now or hereafter belonging to Mortgagor."" 1 6
The debtor later sold his business to BFI Special Services, Inc. (BFI), and
received, as consideration for signing a non-competition covenant, one-quar-
ter of one percent of BFI's gross revenues from its asbestos-abatement busi-
ness. The debtor then borrowed money from another creditor who filed a
financing statement concerning its security interest in the proceeds from the
non-competition covenant. The debtor subsequently defaulted on his debt to
both creditors.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 465.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 466.
115. 858 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ requested).
116. Id. at 588.
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Orix argued that it was entitled to the proceeds from the non-competition
covenant under its after-acquired property security interest because this in-
terest covered all personal property, and the proceeds from the covenant
constituted personal property.' The court disagreed, citing the Black's
Law Dictionary definition of "tangible" and holding that the security inter-
est only covered personal property "wherever located."' "18 The court rea-
soned that because only tangible personal property could have a physical
location, the security interest was limited to tangible personal property.' 19
Continuing, the court declared that, based on Black's definition of "in-
tangibles," a right to receive payments under a covenant not to compete has
no physical form and cannot be seen or touched; thus, as a result, the rights
constituted was intangible property. 120 Therefore, the court concluded, "the
description contained in the security agreement, clearly referring to tangible
property, did not describe or identify the collateral at issue here, intangible
property."' 2'
The court rejected Orix's argument that the debtor's right to the proceeds
was a type of "account" described in the security interest. The court held
that an account is "any right to payment for goods sold or leased or for
services rendered .... -122 The court found that no goods were sold or
leased in connection with the debtor's grant of the covenant not to compete
and that the term "services rendered" implied active performance, which
was not the case here because the debtor refrained from performance.
In any event, the court reasoned that "a party rendering a service confers
something of value upon the party receiving the service,"' 23 and concluded
that the debtor did not confer a value on BFI. Therefore, since the proceeds
were not an account, they must fall within the catch-all category of general
intangibles.' 24 This opinion drew a dissent finding that the majority placed
too much emphasis on the words "wherever located."' 125 For the dissenter,
intangible assets were covered by the security interest because its language
included the phrase "property of every kind and nature."'1 26
There are some aspects to the majority's case besides the argument put
forth by the dissent. First, it uses Black's definition of "tangible," which is
defined as "[h]aving or possessing physical form. .... ,"127 However, Black's
does not have a definition for "intangible."' 28 In its place, the majority uses
the definition for "intangibles" which is an accounting term referring to
"[p]roperty that is a 'right' such as a patent, copyright, trademark, etc.,
117. Id. at 590.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 591 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1456 (6th ed. 1990)).
120. Id. (citing BLACK'S at 809).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 593 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.106 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991)).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 594-95 (Draughn, J., dissenting).
126. Id.
127. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1456 (6th ed. 1990).
128. See id. at 808-09.
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.... "129 Under this definition, the court has little trouble including the
proceeds from a covenant not to compete.
These definitions were not appropriate, however, considering that the ma-
jority held that the description contained in the security agreement, clearly
referring to tangible property, did not describe or identify the collateral
which was at issue here - namely intangible property. 130 The definitions were
inappropriate because Black's defines the terms "tangible property" and "in-
tangible property." The definition for "tangible property" is quite similar to
the definition for "tangible."' 131 In contrast, the definition of "intangible
property" is: "As used chiefly in the law of taxation, this term means such
property as has no intrinsic and marketable value, but is merely the repre-
sentative or evidence of value, such as certificates of stock, promissory notes,
copyrights, and franchisees."' 132 This definition clearly includes the items
specifically mentioned in the security agreement of "accounts, chattel paper,
notes receivable, accounts receivable .... " 3 because none of these scraps of
paper have any intrinsic value. Therefore, since these items are "merely rep-
resentative evidence of value," as defined by Black's, the security interest
clearly envisioned including intangible property. Furthermore, this conclu-
sion avoids the majority's tortured analysis concerning whether the proceeds
of a covenant not to compete are an "account," whereby they conclude that
the proceeds are not an account because, among other things, a covenant not
to compete does not confer any value on the purchaser.' 34 The court's con-
clusion probably comes as a surprise to many business people who appar-
ently have squandered their companies' revenues by purchasing such
"valueless" covenants.
Assuming that this case will remain good law, one solution to avoid this
problem would be to modify the language of the interest to make absolutely
clear that intangible property is included. For example: "property of every
kind and nature, wherever located, and notwithstanding the foregoing, all
intangible property, now or hereafter belonging to Mortgagor." Possibly,
such linguistic overkill will not be needed because writ has been requested in
this case and perhaps the Texas Supreme Court will revisit the issue.
c. Dragnet Clauses
In FDIC v. Bodin Concrete Co. 135 the court considered the limits of a
"dragnet clause" in a deed of trust. In Bodin, Randy Ross executed to First
Bank of Rowlett a $200,000 promissory note secured by a deed of trust on a
tract of land. The deed of trust provided that it secured, in addition to the
$200,000 note, the payment of all other "debts, notes, obligations and liabili-
129. Id. at 809.
130. Orix, 858 S.W.2d at 591 (emphasis added).
131. See BLACK'S at 1456.
132. Id. at 809.
133. Orix, 858 S.W.2d at 588.
134. Id. at 593.
135. No. 87-291, 1993 WL 533832 (Tex. App.-Dallas August 19, 1993, writ requested).
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ties... which may hereafter... be owing" 136 by Ross to the bank. Later,
the bank filed suit against Ross to collect several notes Ross executed prior to
the execution of the $200,000 note. As a result, Ross and the bank entered
into a settlement agreement which mutually released the parties from any
cause of action, and a merger provision which provided that the agreement
superseded all prior written and oral agreements concerning the subject mat-
ter of the settlement. No mention was made in the settlement agreement of
the $200,000 note or the deed of trust.
Ross then purchased building materials from certain suppliers but was
unable to pay. The suppliers filed separate statutory mechanic's lien affida-
vits on the tract of land secured by the bank's deed of trust. Ross subse-
quently defaulted on payments under the settlement agreement, and the
bank foreclosed on the tract of land, purchased it, and applied the proceeds
as a credit against the amounts owing under the settlement agreement. The
suppliers then brought a declaratory judgment action against the bank seek-
ing a judicial declaration that the bank's sale was void on various grounds.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the bank.137 On appeal, the
FDIC (as receiver) was substituted for the bank. The appellate court held
that the suppliers had constitutional, but not statutory, mechanic's liens and
remanded the case to the trial court.' 38 At trial, the court found, among
other things, that the suppliers held superior liens.' 39 The appellate court
reversed and remanded.
The FDIC argued that the bank's dragnet clause included all the prior
notes and not just any new funds advanced in the future or under the prom-
issory note. Relying on Estes v. Republic National Bank,140 the court found
that the language "debts ... which may hereafter ... be owing"' 14' referred
only to Ross' future debt. In Estes, the court found, without explanation,
that the dragnet clause included past and future debts.' 42 The Bodin court
reasoned that in Estes the dragnet clause contained a statement concerning
"all other indebtedness ... owing," which the Bodin court determined re-
ferred to past debt, and another statement concerning "all other indebted-
ness . . . which may hereafter become owing,"' 4 3 which the Bodin court
determined referred to future debt. Here, the court reasoned, the dragnet
clause only contained language similar to the latter statement so that the
bank's dragnet clause encompassed only future debt. '44 Therefore, the bank
had no right to foreclose on the property once Ross defaulted on the settle-
ment agreement. 145
The court did find, however, that the bank's right of foreclosure under the
136. Id. at *1.
137. Id. at *2.
138. Id.
139. Id. at *3.
140. 462 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. 1970).
141. Bodin Concrete Co., 1993 WL 533832 at *4.
142. 462 S.W.2d at 276.
143. Bodin Concrete Co., 1993 WL 533832 at *4.
144. Id. at *5.
145. Id. at *6.
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deed of trust concerning the $200,000 note was not cut off by the terms of
the settlement agreement. The court found that the release provision of the
security agreement referred only to "causes of action," and that a right to a
nonjudicial foreclosure was not a cause of action and was therefore excluded
from the release provision.' 46 Furthermore, the merger provision was inap-
plicable "[b]ecause we have already determined the deed of trust did not
secure payment of this pre-existing indebtedness, [therefore] the deed of trust
did not relate to the subject matter of the settlement agreement."' 47 The
court therefore reversed the district court's determination that the settle-
ment agreement had extinguished the bank's right of foreclosure under the
deed of trust.
The court also reversed the district court's determination that the consti-
tutional mechanic's liens were superior to the deed of trust.' 48 The court
found that a constitutional mechanic's lien is superior to a prior recorded
deed of trust only "if the materials supplied can be removed without mate-
rial injury to the land, pre-existing improvements, or the improvements and
materials themselves."' l4 9 Here, there was no evidence concerning material
injury, so the court remanded the question to the trial court for further
inquiry. 150
3. Commercial Reasonableness
Last Survey period, we reported a case requiring the debtor to affirma-
tively plead commercial reasonableness.' 5 ' Another case coming to this
same conclusion is McDonald v. Foster Mortgage Corp.,152 where the debtor
sought to overturn a summary judgment in favor of the Resolution Trust
Corporation (RTC) by claiming its foreclosure and sale of the debtor's mort-
gaged residence had not been commercially reasonable. The appellate court
upheld the summary judgment because the debtor had answered with a gen-
eral denial and had failed to affirmatively plead commercial reasonableness.
The court held that "[c]ommercial reasonableness is a defense which must
be pled by the debtor, not an element of the lender's cause of action."' 53
Therefore, the lender had no obligation to offer proof rebutting such a de-
fense until after it was affirmatively asserted by the debtor.' 54
4. Deposit Accounts
During the last Survey period, we reported on FDIC v. Golden Imports,
146. Id.
147. Id. at *7.
148. Id. at *10.
149. Id. (citing Justice Mortgage Investors v. C.B. Thompson Constr. Co., 533 S.W.2d 939,
944 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
150. Id. at *11.
151. See Greathouse v. Charter Nat'l Bank-Southwest, 851 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. 1992).
152. 834 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
153. Id. at 576 (citing Smith v. FDIC, 800 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th




Inc.,' 5 5 in which the court determined that a bank's right to setoff the funds
on deposit in an account where the bank is acting as a secured creditor hold-
ing a security interest in the account does not exempt it from the common
law equitable set-off rule.15 6 Under this rule, the bank is charged with the
duty to inquire into the ownership of the account and, if necessary, pay the
funds over to the equitable owner-unless the bank had changed its position
to its detriment. 157 The bank seized the funds from the deposit account but
did not make any further inquiry when it discovered that the funds were
being held for another party. Also, the bank did not change its position to
its detriment, so it was liable for conversion. 158 Furthermore, it was liable
for punitive damages because malice could be inferred from a knowing con-
version. 159 This opinion has been subsequently withdrawn and replaced by
FDIC v. Golden Imports, Inc. 160
In this new opinion, the court did not change its holding that the bank
was subject to the equitable set-off rule or that it was liable for conversion for
failing to abide by the rule.' 61 Also, the court still found that malice and
gross negligence necessary to support an award of punitive damages may be
inferred from knowing conversion; and that evidence existed supporting
such an inference in this case. 162 The court, in a departure from the earlier
opinion, reversed the award of punitive damages because the bank subse-
quently went into receivership by the FDIC and since the bank did not post
a supersedeas bond before its appeal, any award of punitive damages would
have to come from the FDIC which is protected from paying such awards
based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 163
5. Post-Repossession Liability for Ad Valorem Taxes
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals determined that a taxing entity may
impose ad valorem taxes on a secured party in possession, or with the right
of possession, even though the actual legal title is not in that party's name. 164
General Electric Capital Corporation (GECC) financed individual purchases
of mobile homes and retained a security interest in them. During the late
Eighties, hundreds of purchasers defaulted on the loans and GECC repos-
sessed the mobile homes. The taxing authorities attempted to collect delin-
quent property taxes on the homes, but GECC argued that it was not the
owner of the property based on its duties under the U.C.C. to preserve the
155. No. 01-88-00307-CV, 1991 WL 204175 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] Oct. 10,
1991).




160. 859 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, n.w.h.).
161. Id. at 641.
162. Id. at 644.
163. Id. at 647 (citing Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Ault, 256 U.S. 554, 563 (1921)).
164. General Electric Capital Corp. v. City of Corpus Christi, 850 S.W.2d 596 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
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property and sell it in a commercially reasonable manner. The taxing au-
thorities then sued GECC for the delinquent taxes.
The General Electric court held that GECC was liable for the taxes. The
court noted that the Texas Tax Code provides that "property taxes 'are the
personal obligation of the person who owns or acquires the property on Janu-
ary 1 of the year for which the tax is imposed.' "165 The court then deter-
mined that the term "owner," as used in a statute, does not have a definite
meaning but varies under the circumstances. 166 For purposes of assessing
property taxes, however, the term "owner" includes an entity which " 'is the
record owner, or is vested with the apparent legal title, or is in possession
thereof .... 1 ",67 The court did not disagree with GECC's argument that
legal title under the U.C.C. does not pass to the security interest holder but
rather "title passes directly from the debtor to the third-party purchaser in a
foreclosure sale."' 168 The court noted, however, that "[n]either the statute
itself, nor the case law require taxation of the legal title holder only."'1 69
Therefore, the court held that "for purposes of ad valorem taxation, the se-
cured party in possession is the equivalent of the title owner.' 70
6 Valuation of Automobile Security Interest
In a Southern District of Texas Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding, the
court decided to "split the baby" in determining the value of a creditor's
security interest in an automobile.171 It rejected both the debtor's and credi-
tor's arguments that the security interest should be valued based on the right
to foreclose on the collateral or on the full retail price of the vehicle. 17 2 In-
stead, the court held "that the proper value of a vehicle in this context is
somewhere between wholesale and retail, to be determined on a case-by-case
basis."1 73
7. Real Estate Foreclosures
a. Notice
In the preceding Survey period, we reported a case concerning the calcula-
tion of the required 21-day minimum period for giving notice of a foreclo-
sure sale.174 In Nelson the bankruptcy court found that the required 21-day
notice period had not been met where a trustee filed the notice after 3:59
165. Id. at 599 (quoting TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 32.07 (Vernon 1992)) (emphasis added
by the court).
166. Id. (citing Realty Trust Co. v. Craddock, 131 Tex. 88, 112 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex.
1938)).
167. Id. (quoting Childress County v. State, 127 Tex. 343, 92 S.W.2d 1011, 1015, (Tex.
1936)) (emphasis added).
168. Id.
169. Id. (emphasis in original).
170. Id.
171. In re Carlan, 157 B.R. 324 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993).
172. Id. at 325-26.
173. Id. at 326.
174. See First Nat'l Bank Mansfield v. Nelson, 134 B.R. 838 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991);
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(b) (Vernon 1992).
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p.m. on September 15, 1987, but conducted the foreclosure sale prior to 3:59
p.m. on October 6, 1987. Therefore, the full 21-day period (counted in full
24-hour days) had not elapsed. A Texas court, Parker v. First National
Bank, has now ruled that in calculating the 21-day period, the date of notice
is included within the calculation but the date of the sale is excluded.1 75
Therefore, the result in Nelson is contrary to Texas law as applied in Parker,
because the court should have included all of September 15.
A curious facet of the Parker case is that the notice was sent on July 12,
1988, and the foreclosure sale was conducted on August 2, 1988.176 If the
day of sale is excluded from the calculation, the only way that the minimum-
period requirement could have been satisfied (if Nelson is correct) would be
by mailing the notice at exactly twelve midnight on the new day of July 12-
an extremely unlikely occurrence. Unfortunately for the debtor in Parker,
he apparently never disputed the hour when the notice was sent. This uncer-
tainty, however, appears to have been resolved by the 1993 Texas Legislature
which amended the Property Code to state, "The entire calendar day at
which the notice is given, is included in computing the 20-day notice period
required by this subsection, and the entire calendar day on which notice of
sale is given under Subsection (b) is excluded in computing the 20-day notice
period."' 177 This enactment enshrines in law the holding of Parker and
seems to preclude the 24-hour-days argument endorsed by Nelson.
b. Irregularities
In First State Bank v. Keilman 78 the court denied the Keilmans' claims
concerning alleged irregularities that resulted from First State Bank's fore-
closure sale on land pledged as security by the Keilmans through a deed-of-
trust lien. 179 The sale was conducted after posting a notice on the county
courthouse bulletin board which announced the time, place, and terms of the
public auction and gave a legal description of the property. Mr. Keilman
went to the foreclosure sale at 10:00 a.m. on the specified date with a com-
panion, Carl Bierman. The sale was posted to occur between 10:00 a.m. and
1:00 p.m. at the courthouse; and at approximately 10:30 a.m., Keilman left
the courthouse to go to the newspaper office and to check whether the sale
had been advertised in the newspaper. Shortly thereafter, the trustee, Mar-
sha Monroe, appeared to begin the sale. Bierman asked Monroe to delay the
sale until Keilman returned, but she refused. Subsequently, the bank
purchased the property for a price below its fair market value. The bank
applied the proceeds of the sale against the balance of the note and sued the
Keilmans for the remainder. The Keilmans counterclaimed, alleging uncon-
scionability, material alteration, wrongful foreclosure, conspiracy, and
usury. The case went to trial and, based on the jury's findings, the trial court
175. 852 S.W.2d 741, 743 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ requested).
176. Id. at 743.
177. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(d) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
178. 851 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied).
179. Id. at 918.
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rendered judgment in favor of both the Keilmans and the bank. The appel-
late court reversed and rendered that the Keilmans take nothing and re-
manded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.180
The Keilmans contended that the foreclosure sale was wrongful because
of four alleged irregularities. They argued that the posted notice did not
constitute sufficient advertisement for the sale and that an advertisement
should have been placed in the local newspaper. The appellate court noted
that the deed of trust merely stated, "after advertising the time, place and
terms of the sale... the Trustee shall sell the above described property."1 8'
The court noted that this language did not obligate the bank to advertise the
sale in any particular manner, and that the Texas Supreme Court's broad
definition of "advertise," clearly included the posting of notices in public
places.1 82 The Keilmans' second alleged irregularity was that the bank
failed to sufficiently inform prospective bidders and, therefore, unfairly
"chilled the bidding."' 183 The court held that although the notice did not
give a street address for the property, did not disclose that the bank was the
seller, and did not disclose the bank's address or phone number, the notice
was still sufficient under Texas law. 184 The Keilmans also complained that
the bulletin board was cluttered and that the notice ended up beneath other
papers. The court essentially held that the notice only needed to be actually
posted, and what happened to it after the posting was irrelevant.' 85 The
court also rejected the Keilmans third allegation that the foreclosure sale
was wrongful because it took place in their absence. The court noted that
the deed of trust did not give a debtor the right to be present at the foreclo-
sure sale, and that under Texas law the trustee has no legal duty to wait. 186
The last purported irregularity concerned an alleged conflict between a dis-
claimer of U.C.C. warranties contained in the notice and language in the
deed of trust stating that the trustee shall make due conveyance to the pur-
chaser with a general warranty binding the grantor. The court pointed out
that this general warranty was the general warranty of title to the land and
was not a U.C.C. warranty and was therefore not disclaimed in the notice.
In Gainesville Oil & Gas Co. v. Farm Credit Bank 8 7 the court considered
alleged irregularities associated with the sale of a tract of land and the at-
tached mineral rights. In Gainesville the plaintiffs, George and Barbara
Ward, executed a deed of trust for the Farm Credit Bank for certain real
property to a trustee to secure payment of a promissory note. Subsequently,
they entered into a mineral lease with Gainesville Oil & Gas Co. (Gaines-
ville) wherein they conveyed to Gainesville a leasehold mineral estate, re-
180. Id.
181. Id. at 922.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 923.
184. Id. (citing Hutson v. Sadler, 501 S.W.2d 728, 731-32 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, no
writ)).
185. Id.
186. Id. (citing Bering v. Republic Bank, 581 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
187. 847 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, n.w.h.).
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serving for themselves a one-eighth royalty and a one-thirty-second override
out of the working interest. Following the Ward's default, the bank held a
foreclosure sale and conveyed the land and mineral rights by deed to Allan
S. Ward (Ward). The Ward couple and Gainesville then brought suit
against Allan Ward, the bank, and others, claiming that Ward's deed was
invalid because of irregularities in the foreclosure sale and that Ward was
not a good faith purchaser for value. The trial court subsequently granted
the defendants' motion for summary judgment but was reversed by the ap-
pellate court which remanded for a new trial.1 88
The Ward couple argued that some evidence existed that the foreclosure
sale was invalid because the land was sold for a grossly inadequate price and
that Ward, the purchaser, knew that a mineral lease existed on the land.
They argued that under the general rule, a "bona fide purchaser of realty is a
purchaser who buys property in good faith for a valuable consideration with-
out knowledge, actual or constructive, of outstanding claims in a third party
or parties."' 8 9 The court agreed, but found that the corollary of this rule
applied, which stated that "when a lienholder takes a lien in good faith and
for a valuable consideration and without notice of outstanding claims or eq-
uities, a purchaser at the lien foreclosure sale, regardless of the knowledge or
notice the purchaser has, takes good title from the bona fide mortgagee."' 90
Here, the bank, as mortgagee, could not have had notice of the mineral lease
because it received its lien on the property before the mineral lease was exe-
cuted. 191 Therefore, Ward took good title regardless of his knowledge of the
mineral lease. 192
The Ward couple also contended that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment because evidence existed that the Bank had assured the
Ward couple that the mineral lease would not be included in the foreclosure
sale. The appellate court agreed, and found that such assurances "[tiended
to lull the Ward couple into inaction and to diminish competition and stifle
buyer interest in the foreclosure sale."' 193 Therefore, this irregularity in the
foreclosure sale, if proven, would entitle the Ward couple to damages or
invalidation of the sale. 194
188. Id. at 664.
189. Id. at 657.
190. Id. (citing Moran v. Adler, 570 S.W.2d 883, 885 (Tex. 1978)).
191. Id. at 658.
192. Id. In a curious discussion, the court states that a purchaser might not be a good faith
purchaser if he receives the property for grossly inadequate consideration because such consid-
eration should put the purchaser on notice that other claims exist against the property. Id. at
661. The court did not decide this issue because it found that the plaintiffs failed to present
any evidence of the property's fair market value. Id. at 663. This conclusion drew a concur-
rence, which, although otherwise agreeing with the opinion, felt that such evidence had been
presented. Id. at 664 (Cornelius, J., concurring). This whole discussion would seem to be
moot because as the court had just pointed out, under the corollary rule the mortgagee's good
faith overrides any knowledge by the purchaser and therefore it would seem to be irrelevant if
the grossly inadequate consideration would impute such knowledge to the purchaser.
193. Id. at 661.
194. Id. at 659 (citing Charter Nat'l Bank-Houston v. Stevens, 781 S.W.2d 368, 374 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied)).
19941
SMU LAW REVIEW
c. Equitable Subrogation and Lien Priorities
In First National Bank of Kerrville v. O'Dell195 the court was presented
with a novel fact situation where a fourth lienholder foreclosed on certain
real estate without notifying the third lienholder, claiming that its purchase
of the first and second lienholder notes allowed it to bypass the third
lienholder entirely. In this case, Roland Walters purchased certain acreage
from Charlie C. Davis III and others with a promissory note that was se-
cured by a vendor's lien on the acreage. Walters then sold the property to
Dr. David Melton O'Dell with a promissory note secured by a second lien
on the property. O'Dell sold the acreage to Bandera Ranch Partnership
(Bandera) for a nonrecourse promissory note secured by a third lien note.
O'Dell expressly reserved the right to receive notice of any foreclosure sale
under the first and second liens. Finally, the First National Bank of Kerr-
ville made a $570,000 loan to Bandera, and this loan was secured by a fourth
lien on the acreage. Part of the loan proceeds were used to pay off the out-
standing balances secured by the first and second liens. Davis and Walters,
as holders of the first and second liens, executed written assignments of their
liens to the bank. The $570,000 loan between Bandera and the bank also
provided that the liens securing the Davis and Walters notes were valid liens
that had been renewed and extended and still had continued force and effect.
O'Dell had no knowledge of this transaction.
Subsequently, Bandera defaulted on the $570,000 loan, and the bank fore-
closed on the property without giving O'Dell any notice of the foreclosure
sale. The bank was the successful bidder on the acreage and purchased the
property for much less than its fair market value. The next day, the bank
notified O'Dell that its foreclosure sale had extinguished the rights O'Dell
held in the property. O'Dell conducted his own foreclosure sale, where he
was the successful bidder; then he instituted the present action to declare the
bank's sale invalid. The trial court granted the bank's motion for summary
judgment based on the doctrine of equitable subrogation; the Texas Supreme
Court ultimately reversed.
The bank argued that it was able to cut off O'Dell's third lien without
notice under the equitable subrogation doctrine because it had "stepped into
the shoes" of the first and second lienholders. The court noted that when
the bank supposedly extended the first and second liens it did so with parties
which were not personally liable on the notes because they had signed a
nonrecourse note with O'Dell under which he could only look for repayment
to the underlying property based on his lien.196 Under these circumstances,
the court held that when the bank was "paying off" the Walters and Davis
notes it was doing so on behalf of Bandera which-by virtue of its nonre-
course loan-was not liable for the notes. The court held that a bank's pay-
ment "had to be for the benefit of the debtor-i.e., an obligor on the debt-at
the time of the 'subrogation' transaction. ."... ,,97 Here, the bank paid off the
195. 856 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. 1993).
196. Id. at 413.
197. Id. at 415.
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loans, but not for the benefit of anyone obligated under them. Therefore, it
was not entitled to the doctrine. Furthermore, the court held that the doc-
trine was to prevent unjust enrichment of the debtor whose debt was paid; it
was not to be used to deprive an unpaid debtor of his rights. 98 Finally,
because the bank's actions caused its fourth lien to be improperly placed
ahead of O'Dell's third lien, the court determined that it "would not allow
such an inequitable result under the guise of 'equitable' subrogation."' 99
D. LENDER LIABILITY
1. Usury
Although a claim of usury is still a thing to be feared, the Texas and
federal courts seem to have redoubled their efforts during the Survey period
to rear in the beast and, if not to domesticate it, at least curtail its more
wide-ranging pursuits. In one important area, however, the courts have ex-
panded the scope of the usury claim to include overdraft charges, and this
development has potentially wide-ranging ramifications for banking
practices.
a. NSF Check Charges
One Texas court has held that insufficient funds (NSF) check charges can
support a usury claim.200 In this case, Tony's Tortilla Factory (the Factory)
entered into several loans and a revolving line of credit with First Bank. The
Factory also had two checking accounts with First Bank-an operating ac-
count and a payroll account. Both accounts were significantly overdrawn
from April to December 1984. Although the bank voluntarily paid checks
written on the overdrawn accounts as overdrafts, it also charged the Factory
a $20 service charge for each insufficient funds check, resulting in the Fac-
tory being charged over $47,000 during this period. Subsequently, the Fac-
tory and others filed suit against First Bank alleging, among other things,
that the service charges constituted usury. The trial court granted First
Bank's motion for a directed verdict concerning this allegation. 20 1
The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that the Factory had
presented sufficient evidence to have its usury claim decided by a jury. The
court noted that there were three essential elements for a claim of usury:
"(1) a loan of money; (2) an absolute obligation that the principal be repaid;
and (3) the exaction of a greater compensation than allowed by law for the
use of the money by the borrower. ' 20 2 As to the first element, the court
found that "when a bank voluntarily pays a check as an overdraft, it makes a
loan to its customer. ' 20 3 Therefore, the overdrafts made by First Bank were
198. Id.
199. Id. at 416.
200. Tony's Tortilla Factory, Inc. v. First Bank, 857 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1993, writ granted).
201. Id. at 584.
202. Id.
203. Id. (citing Bryan v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 628 S.W.2d 761, 763 n.2 (Tex. 1982)). In a
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loans.2°4 Under the second element, the court found that there was evidence
that the Factory was expected to repay these loans.20 5 The court then deter-
mined under the third element that whether the charge was for the use of the
lender's money or was separate and distinct from that use was a question of
fact for the jury. 20 6 The court pointed out that evidence existed that this
charge constituted interest and was not a mere service charge since First
Bank's president testified that the charge did not merely cover the cost of
reprocessing the checks but that "fee income" was also derived from the
NSF charges. 20 7 The court also pointed out that sufficient evidence existed
to show that if these charges were interest, they easily exceeded the maxi-
mum rate since repayment was expected within a week and the amount of
the NSF checks ranged from $11.44 to $979.65 with most of the checks
being between $100 and $400.208
Obviously, this holding, if allowed to stand, will require financial institu-
tions to rethink their policies concerning overdrafts. One solution may be to
have the charge reflect the actual processing cost-including applicable
overhead. However, the actual cost could still be determined to be interest
and, if so, could not exceed the maximum amount allowed by law. Another
solution is to abolish overdrafts. Ironically, this latter solution is made more
palatable because under the court's reasoning, if a bank charges a $20 NSF
fee but does not honor an overdraft then it is protected from a claim of usury
because it has not engaged in a loan transaction.
b. Savings Clauses Trump Hypothetical Events
During the preceding Survey period, the principle was established that a
usury savings clause will automatically limit the interest rate in a contract
under which a contingency might occur resulting in a usurious rate of inter-
est. 20 9 Since then, two cases, one state and one federal, have reaffirmed Affil-
iated Capital.210 In Dorst the bank sought to recover the remaining balance
on two promissory notes executed by the Dorsts, and which were each se-
cured by a deed of trust.21' Both deeds of trust contained identical "sales
clauses" which allowed the bank to escalate the interest rate by not more
than two percent each time the property was sold during the term of the
note. Each deed of trust also contained a usury savings clause that provided,
separate concurrence, Justice Sam Bass, although agreeing that sufficient evidence existed to
support a usury claim, disagreed with the majority's assertion that the Texas Supreme Court in
Bryan held that an overdraft constitutes a loan as a matter of law. Tony's, 857 S.W.2d at 591.
Apparently, the Texas Supreme Court's statement was made in dicta. Bryan, 628 S.W.2d at
761 n.2.
204. Id. at 585.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 586.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 587.
209. See Affiliated Capital Corp. v. Commercial Federal Bank, 834 S.W.2d 521 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1992, no writ).
210. See First State Bank v. Dorst, 843 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied);
Bernie's Custom Coach v. Small Business Admin., 987 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1993).
211. 843 S.W.2d at 791.
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in pertinent part, "[n]othing herein or in said note contained shall ever enti-
tle Beneficiary, upon the arising of any contingency whatsoever, to receive or
collect interest in excess of the highest rate allowed by the applicable laws
"212
The Dorsts successfully argued to the trial court that the sales clauses
were usurious because they could allow the bank to charge a prohibited rate
of interest if the properties were sold multiple times and if the bank in-
creased the rate of interest by two percent each time. Furthermore, the sav-
ings clauses could not reform the sales clauses because such clauses cannot
rescue contracts that are explicitly usurious, and here the deed of trust, on
its face, allowed a contingency that would result in a usurious interest rate.
Of course, if this argument were allowed to stand, then usury savings clauses
would be obsolete because it is always the case that if a loan instrument
allows for a potentially usurious contingency, the contingency must neces-
sarily be explicit. 2 13
The appellate court reversed the trial court. It agreed that "the mere pres-
ence of a savings clause in a contract will not rescue a contract that is usuri-
ous by its explicit terms. ' ' 2 14 However, this is only true if the savings clause
"is directly contrary to the explicit terms of the contract. ' 21 5 The court ex-
plained this distinction:
As a simple example, a creditor may not specifically contract for a
thirty percent interest rate and then avoid the imposition of usury pen-
alties by relying on a savings clause that declares an intention not to
collect usurious interest. In contrast, under the facts of the present
case, the savings clause is not directly contrary to the explicit terms of
the sales clause; rather, the savings clause supplements and explains the
intent of the parties in contracting for the sales clause by limiting its
application to nonusurious charges of interest. 216
In other words, "a savings clause may cure an open-ended contingency pro-
vision the operation of which may or may not result in a charge of usurious
interest."217
Applying these principles to the case at hand, the court concluded that
"[the] occurrence of the contingency (sale of the property) would not neces-
sarily have resulted in a usurious rate."1218 Therefore, since usury was not a
necessary result of the contingency, the sales clause could be considered in
light of the savings clause-and be subsequently limited or "capped" by that
clause.2 19 Apparently, the court's analysis requires the implicit holding that
a contingency which depends on an open-ended contract provision may only
212. Id. at 792 (emphasis added by the court).
213. If the language was not explicit, but rather was ambiguous, then the contract must be
interpreted and the ambiguity resolved as to avoid a finding of usury. See Bernie's Custom
Coach, 987 F.2d at 1199.
214. Dorst, 843 S.W.2d at 793.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. (citing Smart v. Tower Land & Inv. Co., 597 S.W.2d 333, 340-41 (Tex. 1980)).




be considered to the extent that the provision is triggered on a single
occasion. 220
The Bernie's221 court approached this issue from a different angle but still
arrived at the same result. There, Bernie's Custom Coach executed a prom-
issory note in favor of Gulf American SBL, Inc., which was predominantly
guaranteed by the Small Business Administration (SBA). The note con-
tained an acceleration clause which mandated that Bernie's indebtedness
would become due and payable upon Bernie's failure to timely pay. The
note also contained a usury savings clause. Bernie defaulted on the note,
which Gulf subsequently assigned to the SBA; the SBA then promptly accel-
erated the maturity date of the note and demanded payment. Thereafter,
Bernie, Gulf, and the SBA wound up in federal district court where the
court granted Gulf's summary judgment motion that the note was nonusuri-
ous and legal. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. 222
Bernie argued that although no usurious interest had been imposed, it
could have been imposed based on the acceleration clause. Bernie contended
that the accelerated indebtedness could include all unearned interest which
would result in an interest rate of 88.30%, well above the maximum legal
rate. 223 Furthermore, Bernie pointed out that the savings clause could be
reasonably interpreted to modify the contract only insofar as it concerned
the monthly interest rate and did not apply to any unearned interest that
became due as a result of the acceleration clause. 224
The Fifth Circuit agreed that the hypothetical event could occur under
the explicit terms of the contract and that the savings clause could be read so
as to be inapplicable to the acceleration clause.2 2 5 However, under the
court's analysis, the touchstone was the "intent of the parties embodied in
the contract. ' 2 26 Under this rubric, a presumption exists that the parties
intended a nonusurious contract and therefore a court "must, if reasonably
possible, give effect to the savings clause."' 227 Therefore, "[t]he savings clause
in the promissory note at issue defeats any construction finding the note to
be usurious. ' 228 Here, since the savings clause could be reasonably inter-
preted to be either applicable or inapplicable to the acceleration clause, the
220. If this is not the case, then the court's analysis seems to be dangerously susceptible to
semantic gaming. Here, the contingency did not "necessarily" result in usury because it was
defined as only one sale under the sales clause. However, the Dorsts' argument was that the
contingency should be defined as multiple sales with concomitant increases in the interest rate.
Id. at 792. Under their definition of the contingency, it would "necessarily" result in a usuri-
ous rate. Therefore, the court's whole analysis turns on its definition of the contingency-
which could be easily manipulated by a future court seeking to arrive at the opposite
conclusion.
221. 987 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1993).
222. Id. at 1199.
223. See TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07 (Vernon 1987).
224. 987 F.2d at 1198-99.
225. Id. at 1199.
226. Id. at 1198 (quoting Imperial Corp. of America v. Frenchman's Creek Corp., 453
F.2d 1338, 1344 (5th Cir. 1972)).
227. Id. (quoting FDIC v. Claycomb, 945 F.2d 853, 860 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112




court found that the savings clause applied to the acceleration clause in or-
der to give effect to the parties' intent not to enter into a usurious
contract.
229
This analysis differs from the Dorst court's analysis in a crucial aspect.
Whereas the Dorst court analyzed the effect of the contingency, the Bernie
court analyzed the effect of the savings clause. Both cases concerned poten-
tially usurious contingencies that were facially permissible in their respective
contracts. However, the Dorst court looked to whether the triggering of the
contingency "may or may not" result in usurious interest, and only if it
..may not" result in usury would the court then apply the contract's usury
savings clause. Under this test, the contract at issue in Bernie would be
usurious because the triggering of the contingency-accelerating the
unearned interest-would definitely result in usury. Therefore, under the
Dorst court's analysis, it would seem that a savings clause that explicitly
included a contingency would not operate to eliminate that contingency if
usurious interest would necessarily result from the triggering of that contin-
gency. Under the Bernie court's analysis, however, contingencies that would
definitely trigger usurious interest would be eliminated by the operation of
the contract's savings clause if a reasonable interpretation of that clause
would include such contingencies. Obviously, this analysis gives much
broader effect to savings clauses and practically eliminates a usury argument
based on hypothetical events for contracts that contain usury savings
clauses.
c. "No Prepayment" Clauses and Homestead Loans
The usury statute, although specifying usurious rates of interest, does not
specify how such interest rates should be calculated. 230 Such calculations
can be crucial because under article 5069-1.07(0 prepayment charges and
penalties on a residential homestead loan are disallowed if the rate of interest
on the loan exceeds a prescribed rate. 231 One court has held that in calculat-
ing the rate of interest on a residential homestead loan the interest rates for
purposes of article 5069-1.07(0 "should be determined by spreading the in-
terest over the entire term of the loan."' 232 In so holding, the court rejected
the debtor's argument that article 5069-1.07(0 becomes operative if the in-
terest rate exceeds the maximum rate at any time during the loan. 233
In this declaratory action, the trial court prohibited the holders of the real
estate lien note from enforcing the lien's "no prepayment" clause. The note
provided for 240 monthly payments and an annual interest rate of 9.50% for
the first year, 10.00% for the second year, 11.00% for the third year,
12.00% for the fourth year, and 12.50% thereafter. It was undisputed that
the lawful rate for loans for property to be used as a residential homestead
229. Id. at 1199.
230. See TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(d) (Vernon 1987).
231. Id. at art. 5069-1.07(0.




was 12.00%.234 The debtor brought suit during a year that the interest rate
owed was 12.50%.
The trial court found that since this rate exceeded the rate in article 5069-
1.07(d), the "no prepayment" clause could not be enforced under article
5069-1.07(f). This article provides:
If a loan for property that is to be the residential homestead of the bor-
rower is made at a rate of interest that is greater than the rate pre-
scribed by Subsection (d) of this Article, a prepayment charge or
penalty may not be collected on the loan unless the charge or penalty is
required by an agency created by federal law. 235
The appellate court noted that this section refers to prepayment charges and
does not specifically include clauses which simply prohibit prepayment. 236
The holders of the note argued that subsection (0 does not include such
clauses because under Texas law, unless the loan agreement provides other-
wise, a borrower does not have the right to prepay a loan. 237 Therefore, the6no prepayment" clause did not deprive the borrower of any rights he would
otherwise have had. The appellate court disagreed and concluded that the
legislative intent of subsection (f) "is to protect homeowners by allowing
them to prepay loans when they finance homes at high rates of interest. This
intent would be frustrated if 'no prepayment' clauses were enforced. '238
Therefore, article 5069-1.07(0 includes "no prepayment" clauses even
though such clauses do not impose a specific charge or penalty.
By classifying the "no prepayment" clause as being subject to article 5069-
1.07(0, the court then had to decide how to determine the loan's interest
rate. The debtor argued that because subsection (f) involved homesteads, its
terms should be liberally construed so that if a loan exceeds the usurious rate
at any time during its existence, the loan's "no prepayment" clause becomes
inoperative. The appellate court declined to accept this argument because of
the utter lack of authority for this position.239 Furthermore, concerning
other types of contracts, usury is tested "by spreading the interest over the
entire term of the contract. '240 Therefore, the appellate court adopted this
test for loans concerning homesteads, and remanded the case to the district
court to calculate the interest rate based on this method.
d. Usury Is Not a Defense to Guarantor Liability
In recent years, both Texas courts and the Fifth Circuit (while interpret-
ing Texas law) have held that a guarantor cannot raise usury as a defense to
234. Id. at 556 n.2; see also TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(d) (Vernon 1987).
235. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(0 (Vernon 1987).
236. 860 S.W.2d at 557. The Groseclose court cited a Consumer Credit Commissioner
opinion urging that "no prepayment" provisions in residential homestead loans be construed
as prepayment charges for the purposes of article 5069-1.07(0. Id. (citing Op. Tex. Consumer
Credit Comm'r No. 83-1 (1983)).
237. Id. (citing Parker Plaza W. Partners v. Unum Pension & Ins. Co., 941 F.2d 349, 352
(5th Cir. 1991).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 558.
240. Id. at 557 (citing Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777, 786 (Tex. 1977)).
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liability on a guaranty, so long as the guaranty itself is not a usurious trans-
action.24 1 This principle has been reaffirmed in Moore v. Liddell, Sapp,
Zivley, Hill & LaBoon.242 In Moore the guarantor was granted a bank loan
based on the condition that he guaranteed another's nonusurious debt.
Eventually all the parties defaulted on their debt; and the guarantor was
sued for collection of his debt and the debt he guaranteed. The guarantor
claimed that the requirement that he guarantee another's debt was usurious
based on Alamo Lumber Co. v. Gold.2 4 3 In Alamo Lumber the Texas
Supreme Court ruled that if payment or assumption of another's existing
debt is a condition for the extension of credit, the amount of the debt paid or
assumed would be deemed additional interest for usury calculations. 244 The
Moore court distinguished Alamo Lumber and limited it to situations where
a person, as a requirement for securing a loan, must pay another's debt-not
just guarantee it.245 The court did not extend Alamo Lumber to guarantors
because a guaranty is a secondary obligation and, as such, is of the nature of
a contingent liability. 24 6 Therefore, "[i]nclusion of a contingent liability as
interest on the guarantor's separate obligation would go against the parties'
expectations and greatly increase uncertainty in lending transactions. '247
Although the court's conclusion that a guaranty cannot serve as the basis
for a charge of usury precluded a review of any of the instrument's savings
clauses, this court's reasoning does have some implications concerning
Bernie's Custom Coach and Dorst.248 The Moore court's holding, based on
the parties' intentions, is fully in line with the Fifth Circuit decision Bernie's
Custom Coach. However, there is a tension with this case and the reasoning
of the previously discussed Dorst decision. Under Dorst, one would look to
see if the triggered contingency would necessarily lead to usurious interest.
Here the contingency-default by the primary obligor-would require the
guarantor to pay all of the primary obligor's debt, which, under Alamo Lum-
ber, would seem to be usurious.
e. Other "Charging" Cases
In the prior Survey period, we reviewed McPherson Enterprises, Inc. v.
Producers Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. ,249 in which the Austin
Court of Appeals held that in a good faith disagreement regarding the
amount owed, the lender does not violate the usury statute by demanding
interest on a higher principal amount, even if the actual principal amount is
241. See First South Savings Ass'n v. First Southern Partners, II, Ltd., 957 F.2d 174 (5th
Cir. 1992); Bank of El Paso v. T.O. Stanley Boot Co., 809 S.W.2d 279, 290 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 847 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. 1992).
242. 850 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied).
243. 661 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. 1983).
244. Id. at 928.
245. Moore, 850 S.W.2d at 293.
246. Id. at 294.
247. Id.
248. See supra notes 210-29 and accompanying text.
249. 827 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied).
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less.250 In this Survey period, the Austin Court of Appeals reaffirmed this
holding in Kentor v. Karotkin.251 Here, Michael Kentor signed a promissory
note as part of a divorce settlement with his wife, Alden Karotkin
(Karotkin). Kentor defaulted on the note and Karotkin hired two different
attorneys, on different occasions, to seek collection of the note. Both attor-
neys sent Kentor collection letters which inadvertently overstated the princi-
pal amount due on the note. Kentor claimed that this overstatement
resulted in a usurious charge. Relying on McPherson, the appellate court
rejected Kentor's argument, holding that since the overstated principal
amount was due to an inadvertent error, "the overcharge caused by the fail-
ure to properly credit principal does not constitute a demand for usurious
interest. '252
In First State Bank v. Keilman253 previously discussed, one of the
Keilmans' usury claims was that the attorney for the Bank sent them a de-
mand letter notifying them that the amount past due was $12,699.92 plus
interest. The Keilmans presented evidence at trial that they had an oral
agreement with a loan officer that they only had to make interest-only pay-
ments and that the interest in arrears when the letter was sent was $5,508.48.
Therefore, the Bank charged the Keilmans $7,161.44 in excess interest and
that the charging of such interest constituted usury. The Bank's loan officer
testified that the oral agreement allowed the Keilmans to make interest-only
payments provided that those payments were timely-which was not the
case-so that no excess interest was charged. The jury determined that $360
of unauthorized interest was charged. The court ruled that there existed no
rational basis for the finding and therefore the finding had to be disregarded
because there was no evidence to support it.254
The Keilmans also contended that usury arose from the Bank's subse-
quent foreclosure sale wherein the Bank purchased the Keilmans' property
for less than fair market value, and after applying the proceeds to the out-
standing balance of their debt, sought collection of the remainder. They ar-
gued that the market value of the property received and the value of the
deficiency claim pursued "constituted a charge of excessive compensation
for the loan of money. ' 255 The court found that no usury arose under the
controlling law at the time of the transaction. 256 However, under current
law, "if a court determines that the fair market value of the foreclosed prop-
erty is greater than the foreclosure sale price, the deficiency is reduced by the
difference between the fair market value and the bid price, regardless of
whether the foreclosure sale was regularly or irregularly conducted. '257
250. Id. at 96.
251. 852 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied).
252. Id. at 267.
253. 851 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied).
254. Id. at 931.
255. Id. at 932.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 932 n.6 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003 (Vernon Supp. 1992)).
[Vol. 47
BANKING LAW
2 Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Once again, Texas courts have declined the invitation proffered by bor-
rowers to hold their lenders accountable under a standard of good faith and
fair dealing. As recently affirmed by one case, "there is no duty of good faith
and fair dealing arising out of the lender/borrower or mortgagor/mortgagee
relationship. ' 258 However, this has not stopped debtors from attempting to
paint their relationship as having special attributes deserving of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing.
In Central Savings & Loan Association v. Stemmons Northwest Bank,
N.A. 259 Central Savings & Loan Association (Central) and TriTexas Mort-
gage Corporation (TriTexas) entered into a mortgage servicing agreement in
which TriTexas agreed to collect the debt service payments on certain of
Central's mortgage loans and to provide administrative support to Central.
A dispute subsequently arose over the availability of private mortgage insur-
ance for some of the loans. In a settlement agreement, TriTexas agreed to
act as the mortgage insurer for those loans, and secured its obligation by
delivering to Central, as beneficiary, a letter of credit issued by Stemmons
Northwest Bank, N.A. (Stemmons). Unknown to Central, Harold Peek
(Peek), an officer, director, and employee of TriTexas, entered into a letter of
credit indemnification agreement with Stemmons providing that he would be
responsible for all expenses and claims arising from the letter if Stemmons
followed his instructions regarding the letter. Stemmons, as issuer of the
letter of credit, later told Central that it would not renew the letter. Central
then demanded that TriTexas comply with its obligations under the settle-
ment agreement, which it declined to do. Subsequently, Central presented
the letter of credit to Stemmons, but Stemmons refused to honor it. Central
then filed suit, claiming inter alia that Stemmons had breached its common
law duty of good faith and fair dealing by dishonoring the letter of credit,
and by conspiring with Peek to interfere with the letter of credit. The trial
court granted summary judgment to all defendants on all issues, and the
appellate court affirmed. 26°
The appellate court first rejected Central's claim that, under the common
law, the letter of credit somehow created a special relationship between Cen-
tral and Stemmons.261 Central maintained that this special relationship ex-
258. McDonald v. Foster Mortgage Corp., 834 S.W.2d 573, 576 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (citing FDIC v. Coleman, 795 S.W.2d 706, 708-09 (Tex. 1990)).
259. 848 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
260. Id. at 236.
261. Id. at 240. Such a finding of a "special relationship" is crucial under the common law
because a common law duty of good faith and fair dealing cannot otherwise be sustained since,
under Texas law, no general duty exists. See English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex.
1983). Although not alleged by Central, a statutory duty of good faith and fair dealing exists
under the Uniform Commercial Code as part of every commercial contract. See TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 1.203 (Tex. U.C.C.) (Vernon 1968). However, a breach of this duty does
not create an independent cause of action but rather gives rise to a cause of action for breach of
contract. Adolph Coors Co. v. Rodriguez, 780 S.W.2d 477, 481 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1989, writ denied). Such a cause does not afford access to punitive damages and hence blunts
its attractiveness to plaintiffs and their attorneys.
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isted due to "the relationship of Central as beneficiary and Stemmons as the
issuer of the letter of credit. ' 262 The court determined that a special rela-
tionship exists only if one of two criteria is met: (1) there is an element of
trust necessary to accomplish the goals of the undertaking; or (2) there exists
an imbalance of bargaining power. 263 Here, the court found that no special
relationship existed:
Because one business entity trusts another and relies on their contrac-
tual promise to perform the contract does not cause a special relation-
ship. Neither does the position of the parties to a letter of credit cause
an imbalance of bargaining power. We conclude that the relationship
of Central as beneficiary and Stemmons as issuer in the letter of credit is
an ordinary commercial contractual relationship and does not consti-
tute the 'special relationship' necessary to give rise to a common law
duty of good faith and fair dealing.264
As discussed below, the court also denied Central's claims for fraud, con-
spiracy, and tortious interference. The court's refusal to further extend tort
principles into traditional contract law areas, even in a case with fairly egre-
gious facts, seems to confirm the trend of Texas courts to resist efforts to
convert simple breach of contract claims into torts with the attendant possi-
bility of punitive damages.
3. Deceptive Trade Practices Act
Under section 17.50 of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA),
a "consumer" is one who seeks to acquire goods or services. 265 The issue
has long been settled that one who seeks to borrow money, and nothing
more, does not fall within the definition of a consumer.266 However, plain-
tiffs still try to shoehorn themselves into consumer status by attempting to
link the loan proceeds to some good or service.
In First State Bank v. McMordie 267 the plaintiff argued that he was a con-
sumer even though he had been turned down for a loan because if he had
received the loan he would have used the proceeds to acquire certain goods
- specifically, cattle. Although he was awarded damages by the trial court,
that court's decision was overturned on appeal. The appellate court agreed
that a person might be a consumer under the DTPA where he receives the
loan proceeds and then he uses the loan to purchase a "good or service." '268
However, McMordie failed to present any evidence that he had "sought or
acquired, by purchase or lease, cattle which form the basis of his
complaint. ' 269
262. Id. at 239.
263. Id. at 239-40.
264. Id. at 240.
265. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987).
266. See Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169 (Tex.), on remand, 605 S.W.2d
954 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston list Dist.] 1980, no writ).
267. 861 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ).
268. Id. at 286 (citing Knight v. Int'l Harvester Credit Corp., 627 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. 1982);




In First State Bank v. Keilman,270 previously discussed, one of the
Keilmans' claims was that the Bank engaged in unconscionable conduct as
defined under the DTPA by selling the Keilmans' property for a grossly
inadequate price and that this conduct resulted in a wrongful foreclosure
sale. The court noted that the DTPA has two different definitions of "un-
conscionable action or course of action," which require that the act: "(A)
takes advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity of a
person to a grossly unfair degree; or (B) results in a gross disparity between
the value received and consideration paid, in a transaction involving the
transfer of consideration. " 271 The court found that the Keilmans' allegation
implicated part (B) of the definition but that "a general finding of unconscio-
nability under the DTPA does not necessarily prove that the foreclosure sale
was wrongful. ' 272 This is because "[i]nadequacy of consideration alone does
not render a foreclosure sale void if the sale was legally and fairly made. '273
Since the court had already found that the sale was otherwise lawful, it re-
jected the Keilmans' claim because even if the property was sold for grossly
inadequate consideration, that in and of itself would not render the foreclo-
sure sale wrongful. 274
The court also found that the Keilmans were not "consumers" under the
DTPA.275 The Keilmans argued that they were consumers because they
purchased foreclosure services to be performed by the trustee named in the
deed of trust which was used to secure their loan from the Bank. They based
this contention on the standard form language of the deed of trust which
stated: "[O]ut of the money arising from such [foreclosure] sale, the Trustee
acting shall pay ... a commission of five percent (5%) to himself."' 276 The
court found that the Keilmans' purpose in obtaining the loan was to secure
an extension of credit; and that the property securing the loan was already
owned by the Keilmans and simply provided additional collateral for the
loan. 277 Therefore, "an extension of credit alone does not confer consumer
status under the DTPA.' '278 The court also held that the commission paya-
ble to the trustee did not constitute the purchase of a "service," because "the
key principle in determining consumer status is that the goods or services
purchased must be an objective of the transaction, not merely incidental to
it."279
In one case, the debtor was classified as a consumer because the proceeds
had been used to purchase goods.280 Once this fact was shown, the defini-
tion of "consumer" blossomed to include collateral services associated with
270. 851 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied).
271. Id. at 927-28 (quoting TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(5) (Vernon 1987)).
272. Id. at 927.
273. Id. (citing Tarrant Say. Ass'n v. Lucky Homes, Inc., 390 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. 1965)).
274. Id. at 928.
275. Id.
276. Id. (alteration in original).
277. Id. at 929.
278. Id. at 928 (citing Riverside Nat'! Bank, 603 S.W.2d 169).
279. Id. at 929 (citing FDIC v. Munn, 804 F.2d 860, 863-64 (5th Cir. 1986)).
280. FDIC v. F & A Equip. Leasing, 854 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ).
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the loan.2 8' In F& A Equipment the court determined that a debtor is still a
"consumer" under the DTPA if the collateral the debtor purchased under
the original loan is later transferred to a third party with the assistance of the
creditor; and the bank's services in connection with this assistance is the
basis for the debtor's claim.282 Here, the debtor signed a promissory note to
purchase certain earth moving equipment which served as the collateral for
the note.283 The debtor then transferred the equipment to a third party who
signed onto the promissory notes. Subsequently, the equipment disappeared.
The debtor sought damages under the DTPA wherein the bank assisted the
debtor in transferring the collateral to the third party because the bank had
run a credit check on the third party and knew that the party was a bad
credit risk. The bank argued that the third party was the consumer and not
the debtor. The court found that the bank's continuing relationship with the
debtor made its later services "merely collateral to the original loans and...
additional objectives of the same transaction. ' 28 4 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that the debtor was a consumer. 285
Presumably, the third party is also a consumer because it acquired the
collateral with the bank's assistance by signing onto the bank's note. This
presents a problem for the bank because under the court's decision it could
be held liable under the DTPA by either the buyer or the seller in a transac-
tion where collateral is purchased by the seller for resale to the buyer and
both sales are financed by the bank. Given the inherently antagonistic na-
ture of the buyer-seller relationship, if either party later feels that it has been
denied the benefit of its bargain, it could drag the bank into court claiming
that the bank provided services to one party to the detriment of the other.
For example, in this case, the debtor is basically claiming that in the bank's
rush to finance the transaction, it neglected to tell the debtor of the third
party's finance history. But suppose the bank did tell the debtor of the
buyer's credit history, and as a result the transaction did not go through and
the buyer was harmed. It would seem that the buyer could come back and
challenge the validity of the credit report and argue that the bank had
harmed it under the DTPA. Such a situation places the bank in the untena-
ble position between the seller's Charybdis and the buyer's Scylla.
4. Fraud
Considering the fraud issues raised in Central Savings & Loan Association
v. Stemmons Northwest Bank, N.A.,286 previously discussed, the court re-
jected Central's claim that Stemmons acted willfully, fraudulently, and in
bad faith by failing to disclose to Central its indemnification agreement with
Peek so that it would suffer no liability when it refused to honor Peek's com-
281. Id. at 691.
282. Id.
283. FDIC v. F & A Equip. Leasing, 800 S.W.2d 231, 233 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990), rev'd
per curiam, 835 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. 1992).
284. F & A Equip. Leasing, 854 S.W.2d at 691.
285. Id.
286. 848 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
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pany's letter of credit under which Central was the beneficiary. 287 The court
noted that although the failure to perform a contract usually sounds in con-
tract and not tort; breach of a contract to perform in the future is actionable
fraud if the party entered into the contract with the intention of deceiving
and with no intention of performing. 288 Mere failure to perform is no evi-
dence of a party's intent.289 Here, the court found that no evidence existed
that Stemmons had no intention of performing the contract when it entered
into the letter of credit. 290
Furthermore, when a party suffers only economic injury to the subject
matter of the contract and he cannot prove actual damages attributable to
the fraud, then the action sounds in contract, and not in tort.291 Again, the
court found that Central had presented no evidence of damages beyond the
economic injury to the subject matter of the contract. 292
5. Tortious Interference and Conspiracy
Another claim rejected in Central Savings & Loan Associates v. Stemmons
Northwest Bank, N.A.,293 previously discussed, concerned Peek's and Stem-
mon's alleged conspiracy to tortiously interfere with Central's letter of credit
by entering into the indemnification agreement. The court noted that the
"gist of a civil conspiracy is the damage resulting from commission of a
wrong that injures another and not the conspiracy itself."' 294 Therefore, no
independent liability exists for a civil conspiracy absent the existence of an
actionable wrong that serves as the gravamen of the conspiracy. 295 Hence,
the court found that in order to establish a conspiracy, Central must first
establish a case for tortious interference which allegedly served as the con-
spiracy's basis.
A case for tortious interference requires a showing of tortious acts com-
mitted by a third party.296 Here, Stemmons was a party to the letter of
credit. Since one cannot tortiously interfere with one's own contract, Stem-
mons could not tortiously interfere with the letter of credit since it was a
287. Id. at 240.
288. Id. (citing Spoljaric v. Percival Tours, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 432, 434 (Tex. 1986)).
289. Id. (citing Crim Truck & Tractor v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591,
597 (Tex. 1992)).
290. Id.
291. Id. (citing Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. 1986); Schin-
dler v. Austwell Farmers Coop., 829 S.W.2d 283, 290 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992), afl'd
as modified per curiam, 841 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. 1992)).
292. Id. at 241.
293. 848 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
294. Id. at 241 (citing Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp. v. Nortex Oil and Gas Corp.,
435 S.W.2d 854, 856 (Tex. 1968)). As noted by the court, the elements of a civil conspiracy
are: "(1) two or more persons; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of minds on the
object or course of action; (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts; and (5) damages as a proxi-
mate result." Id. (citing Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex. 1983)).
295. Id.
296. Id. The elements of tortious interference are: "(1) a contract existed that is subject to
interference; (2) the act of interference was willful and intentional; (3) such intentional act was
a proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages; and (4) actual damage or loss occurred." Id.
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party to the letter of credit. 297
Along similar lines, the court in First State Bank v. Keilman,298 previously
discussed, rejected the debtors' claim that the Bank and trustee had engaged
in a conspiracy to cheat or oppress the Keilmans by means of a wrongful
foreclosure sale.299 Although the trustee accepted a bid from the Bank
which was below the loan amount, this action was not unlawful and neither
the Bank nor the trustee violated any duty they might have owed to the
Keilmans. 3°° Since no underlying wrongful activity occurred, there was no
basis for a civil conspiracy. 30 1
6. Material Alteration
In Keilman30 2 one of the jury's findings overturned by the appellate court
was the finding that First State Bank had altered the interest rate in the
renewal note without the consent or authorization of the Keilmans. 30 3 The
original note issued by Frontier National Bank contained a typographical
error which stated that the interest rate was the prime rate "plus two percent
(12.5%) per annum. ' '3°4 This error was corrected in the renewal note to
read "plus Two percent (2%) per annum. ' 30 5 The court held that no mate-
rial alteration occurred because "[r]egardless of the typed numerals, the
written words setting the interest rate at 'prime plus two percent' control the
legal interpretation of the note."' 306 The court also found that the Keilmans
failed to present any evidence of fraudulent intent on the Bank's part. 307
This case is a bit disturbing in that the Bank had to go through a jury trial
and the appellate process before a court reaffirmed the long-settled principle
that the words control over the numerals in a written contract.
7. Conversion
In Whitaker v. Bank of El Paso30 8 the court underlined the importance for
a debtor to unequivocally demand the return of-and for the repossessing
bank to unequivocally refuse to return-the debtor's collateral in order for
the debtor to sustain an action for conversion. 30 9 In that case, Whitaker
purchased eight mobile homes for cash without changing the original title
deeds. Because of the confusing array of title claims, however, the Bank of
El Paso held a prior security interest on the homes by virtue of a promissory
note executed by an unrelated third party. When the third party defaulted
297. Id.
298. 851 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied).
299. Id. at 925.
300. Id. at 927.
301. Id. at 925.
302. Id. at 914.
303. Id. at 919.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 920 (citing Guthrie v. Nat'l Homes Corp., 394 S.W.2d 494, 495 (Tex. 1965)).
307. Id. at 921.
308. 850 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, no writ).
309. Id. at 761.
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on the promissory note, the bank repossessed the mobile homes after receiv-
ing a judgment and writ of sequestration. Subsequently, Whitaker sent the
bank a letter which stated in pertinent part, "If you know anything about
these homes, please advise me."' 310 The Bank responded by correspondence
to Whitaker that it would not object to a release of the property if "you have
documentation indicating that you are, in fact, the owner of some mobile
homes" which the bank had repossessed. 311 Whitaker then filed suit for con-
version. The suit was denied based on the bank's motion for summary judg-
ment. Whitaker appealed and the appellate court affirmed.
The appellate court held that in order to sustain a cause of action for
conversion usually a "plaintiff must establish that he demanded return of the
property, and that the defendant refused to return it.'" 31 2 Although demand
and refusal are not always necessary, there must always be a manifestation
by the defendant of a clear repudiation of the plaintiff's rights--either
through words or actions. 31 3 Therefore, "a qualified good faith refusal based
on a reasonable requirement does not constitute conversion. '31 4 A qualified
good faith refusal would include "[a] refusal to deliver property on request
... in order to investigate the rights of the parties," where such a refusal "is
made in good faith to resolve a doubtful matter. ' 31 5 However, such a quali-
fied refusal "must be distinctly stated to the party demanding possession
. . . . Any reasons for refusing to turn over the property which are not
mentioned at the time of the refusal are lost and may not be raised later. '316
Applying these rules, the Whitaker court found that, "Whitaker never asked
anyone to give him the mobile homes; at most, he asked for information
about them. Defendants never refused to give him the mobile homes; at
most, they made a reasonable request that he identify those which he
claimed and provide some proof of his ownership interest. '317
8 Res Judicata Defenses
The Fifth Circuit has determined that a lender liability claim based on a
loan that was part of the borrower's bankruptcy may not be asserted after
the bankruptcy plan is confirmed, because of the res judicata effect of the
confirmation. 31 8 The court determined that it was irrelevant that the lender
liability claim was not raised in the bankruptcy proceeding because under
the transactional test the loan disposed of under the confirmation order and
the lender liability claim based on the loan are considered identical claims
for res judicata purposes.319 The claims are considered identical because the
validity of the loan was a core issue in the bankruptcy proceeding and the
310. Id. at 761.
311. Id.





317. Id. at 762.
318. Eubanks v. FDIC, 977 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992).
319. Id. at 171. In a transactional test, "the critical issue is whether the two actions were
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debtor's subsequent lender liability claim concerning that loan would put
into "issue the same facts which would determine, inter alia, the treatment
and amount of the debt owed" the bank in the bankruptcy proceeding. 320
In Jones v. First National Bank ofAnson 321 the court held that the wife of
a debtor who brought a claim based on the creditor bank's action of partially
paying off the debtor's loan through a set-off from his joint deposit account
with his wife was barred by res judicata. 322 The bank had obtained an ear-
lier default judgment against the debtor based on the post-set-off amount of
the loan. The court held that the wife's claim was logically related and she
was in privity with her husband so that res judicata applied.3 23
E. DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS
1. Joint Accounts
Last year, the Texas Supreme Court decided that unless a financial institu-
tion has received written notice that withdrawals in accordance with the
terms of a joint account should not be permitted from any party able to
request present payment-for example, due to the death of one of the parties
to the joint account-the institution will not be liable for paying in accord-
ance with the terms of the account, regardless of the beneficial ownership of
the account.3 24 This decision has been followed by MBank Corpus Christi,
N.A. v. Shiner,325 which overturned the trial court's grant of summary judg-
ment to the beneficiaries of the account. 326 The trial court found that the
bank was liable for paying funds to a party to a joint account after the other
party had died because the account did not contain a right of survivorship.
Citing to Bandy, the appellate court held, "between competing interests in a
joint account, the bank is fully discharged from liability when it pays the
other party on the account, unless one of the parties gives written notice to
the bank that no payment should be made."' 327 Since the beneficiaries gave
no written notice to the bank instructing it not to allow the surviving joint
account party to withdraw the funds, the appellate court reversed the trial
court's judgment in favor of the beneficiaries and rendered judgment in favor
of the bank.328
2. Unauthorized Signature Liability
a. Validity of Deposit Agreement
A depositor's challenge to a bank's deposit agreement which limited to
based on the 'same nucleus of operative facts.'" (quoting Howe v. Vaughan, 913 F.2d 1138,
1144-45 (5th Cir. 1990)).
320. Id. at 172.
321. 846 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1992, no writ).
322. Id. at 110.
323. Id. at 109-10.
324. See Bandy v. First State Bank, 835 S.W.2d 609, 616 (Tex. 1992).
325. 840 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ).
326. Id. at 727.




sixty days its responsibility for its own lack of good faith or failure to exer-
cise ordinary care in discovering an unauthorized signature on drafts
presented to it, was rebuffed in Tumlinson v. First Victoria National Bank.3 29
Between September 1989 and September 1990, some forty-five checks with
alleged forged signatures were drawn on the plaintiffs' joint account-until
the bank was alerted to the forgeries on or about September 26, 1990. The
bank's deposit agreement provided, inter alia, that a depositor must notify
the bank within fourteen days of an unauthorized signature but that the
bank lost this protection "if we fail to exercise ordinary care in paying an
item with an unauthorized signature unless you do not notify us of the prob-
lem within 60 days of when we send or make available to you the statement
and items."'330
The court upheld the agreement and determined that the bank may only
be liable for drafts that it honored within sixty days of the notification it
received on September 26, 1990. In arriving at this conclusion, the court
recognized that Texas law "ordinarily allows a depositor one year to report
an unauthorized signature before his claim is cut off."'331 The court noted,
however, that "Texas law allows parties to a depository agreement to alter
their responsibilities by agreement, so long as the agreement does not 'dis-
claim the bank's responsibility for its own lack of good faith or failure to
exercise ordinary care. .... ,-332 The court then determined that the agree-
ment was enforceable. 333
b. Bar on Double Recovery
In Temple v. FDIC334 the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the
one recovery rule enunciated in Bradshaw v. Baylor University 335 should be
disregarded concerning a bank's liability for a forged endorsement.3 36 The
payee argued that such claims should be analyzed under Duncan v. Cessna
Aircraft Co. ,337 wherein the Texas Supreme Court determined that Bradshaw
did not apply and that multiple recoveries were possible in a strict-liability
tort case concerning comparative fault and involving numerous defendants
and plaintiffs.33 The court in distinguishing Duncan intimated that Duncan
is applicable only in the tort context and that the issues here were "fully
contractual in their gravamen and in which the plaintiff is suing solely be-
cause he did not recover what he contracted to receive." '339 The court then
held that although a payee's bank or the collecting bank may be liable for
329. 865 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, n.w.h.).
330. Id. at 177 (emphasis omitted).
331. Id. at 177 (citing TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.406(d) (Vernon 1968)).
332. Id. (quoting TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.103(a) (Vernon 1968)).
333. Id. at 178.
334. 988 F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1993).
335. 126 Tex. 99, 84 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. 1935).
336. Temple, 988 F.2d at 29.
337. 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
338. Temple, 988 F.2d at 25.




accepting a forged check, such liability does not extend to situations where
the payee has settled his claim with the forger for the full amount of the
check. 340
F. SURETIES AND GUARANTORS
In Miller v. University Savings Association341 the guarantor of a defaulted
note claimed that he was excused from his guaranty because the holder of
the note did not notify him of the holder's intent to accelerate the maturity
of the note. The court disagreed, explaining that a holder of a note does
have the obligation to the maker of a note to notify the maker of the holder's
intent to accelerate. 342 However, no such requirement exists "that notice of
intent to accelerate be given to a guarantor. '343
In Chambers v. NCNB Texas National Bank 34 a partner who guaranteed
his partnership's debt claimed that he was no longer liable on his guaranty
because the partnership converted into a corporation and the underlying
debt had been "replaced," i.e., renewed and extended. 345 The court had lit-
tle trouble rejecting these claims. The court found that the guaranty applied
to "all renewals and extensions thereof' and characterizing the loan's re-
newal as a "replacement" did not invalidate the guaranty. 346 Furthermore,
the guaranty stated that a change in status of the debtor by "merger, consoli-
dation or otherwise" does not alter the guarantor's liability. 347 The court
held that this language includes incorporation and the word "incorporation"
need not be mentioned specifically in the guaranty. 348
In FDIC v. F & A Equipment Leasing,349 previously discussed, the court
determined under what circumstances a co-maker of a note subsequently
becomes a surety of the note after another party signs the note and becomes
principally liable under it. The pertinent facts of this case are that F & A
Leasing and others (collectively, "F & A") were the original makers of a
note which was subsequently signed by Bobby and Vernon Wilson (the Wil-
sons). Upon default, First Consolidated Bank-Pleasant Run, N.A. (the
Bank) sought collection from the Wilsons and then F & A. F & A claimed
that it was a surety on the note and that as such the Bank's claim was subject
to the defense of collateral impairment. 350 The FDIC, as receiver for the
Bank, claimed that F & A was not a surety because it was a co-maker of the
note; thus, the surety defense was not available. The district court found
340. Id. at 24.
341. 858 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
342. Id. at 36 (citing Shumway v. Horizon Credit Corp., 801 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex. 1991)).
343. Id. (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Little Joe Trawlers, Inc., 776 F.2d 1249,
1252 (5th Cir. 1985)).
344. 841 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
345. Id. at 134.
346. Id.
347. Id. (emphasis added by the court).
348. Id.
349. 854 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ).
350. Id. at 684; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.606(a)(2) (Vernon 1968).
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that F & A was a surety and that it could prevail on the defense of collateral
impairment.
The court determined that a co-maker could be a surety (and thereby pre-
vail on the defense of collateral impairment) if he could show: (1) that as the
original maker he entered "into an agreement with another whereby the sec-
ond party is to assume the note, [so that] as between them, the assumptor
becomes primarily liable and the original maker becomes a surety;" and (2)
that the creditor "has accepted the assumption and consented to the
change ... .-"351 The court found that although there existed more than a
scintilla of evidence supporting these two propositions, the evidence was in-
sufficient because the overwhelming weight of the evidence supported a find-
ing that the bank did not consent to F & A's changed status.352 Therefore,
the appellate court reversed and remanded the trial court's judgment dis-
charging F & A's liability on the note.
G. MISCELLANEOUS CASES
1. Statute of Limitations and Adverse Domination
In FDIC v. Shrader & York 353 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the grant of sum-
mary judgment to Shrader & York and its co-defendants in the legal mal-
practice action brought by the FDIC as successor to City Savings & Loan
Association (City Savings) and Lamar Savings Association of Texas (Lamar
Savings). In Shrader the FDIC asserted that Shrader & York, a law firm,
and its individual partners negligently contributed to the failure of City Sav-
ings and Lamar Savings by doing faulty legal work in five transactions. The
FDIC alleged that Shrader & York failed to give competent legal advise
thereby allowing some of the transactions to violate federal laws. Further,
the FDIC contended that Shrader & York allowed Stanley E. Adams, Jr.
(Adams) to deceive the Lamar Savings and City Savings directors. Adams
was the owner and top official of the two thrifts. The FDIC theorized, if
Shrader & York had alerted the directors of City Savings and Lamar Savings
of the illegal nature of the five transactions, the boards of directors would
have blocked the transactions thereby averting the losses resulting from the
transactions.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas (the
District Court) held that City Savings' and Lamar Savings' legal malpractice
claims against Shrader & York were barred by the Texas statute of limita-
tions for legal malpractice before the two savings and loans were declared
insolvent and such claims were sold by the FSLIC in its receiver capacity to
the FSLIC in its corporate capacity on May 18, 1988. The Texas limitation
period for legal malpractice claims is two years.354 The parties agreed that
the occurrences giving rise to the legal malpractice claims against Shrader &
York occurred before May 1986, therefore, all claims expired before May of
351. F& A Equip., 854 S.W.2d at 686.
352. Id. at 689.
353. 991 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1993).
354. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon 1986).
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1988 unless the limitation period was extended by an equitable doctrine as
asserted by the FDIC.
The FDIC asserted that two equitable doctrines should extend the limita-
tion period. First, the FDIC asserted that the Texas discovery rule kept the
statute of limitations from running before May of 1988. Citing Willis v.
Maverick,3 55 the court noted that "the statute of limitations for legal mal-
practice actions does not begin to run until 'the claimant discovers or should
have discovered through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence the
facts establishing the elements of his cause of action.' ",356 The FDIC con-
tended that the District Court had erroneously presumed that because Ad-
ams had knowledge of City Savings' and Lamar Savings' activities, he knew
of Shrader & York's malpractice. The Fifth Circuit Court noted that "[t]he
FDIC's argument assumes that Texas' discovery rule requires actual knowl-
edge."' 357 Citing Willis, the court stated "In fact, the limitations period on
the legal malpractice claim begins to run when 'the claimant discovers or
should have discovered through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence
the facts establishing the elements of his cause of action.' ",358 The court
reasoned that Adams was intimately involved with the transactions at issue
due to his ownership and management positions with the financial institu-
tions. Further, the court cited a related action, Lamar Fin. Corp. v. Ad-
ams,35 9 in which the
FDIC accused Adams of "deliberately ...entering into unsafe and
unsound transactions" that "generated no new cash to Lamar," but
"dramatically increased [Lamar's] exposure to risk," and caused Lamar
to sustain losses. Moreover, the FDIC pled that Adams and others
"carried out a scheme" to "disguis[e] and hid[e] from regulatory au-
thorities, depositors, creditors, and others, the negative impact of these
risky loans and investments upon [Lamar's] regulatory worth.''36°
Holding that Adams should have discovered losses caused by the schemes
and other facts establishing any legal malpractice claims by City Savings and
Lamar Savings against Shrader & York, the court stated "[T]he FDIC
claims, in one breath, that Adams engaged in elaborate schemes to circum-
vent banking regulations. It cannot claim in the next breath that Adams was
not aware that Shrader & York negligently facilitated those schemes."' 361
The court held as a matter of law that Adams' knowledge was imputed to
City Savings and Lamar Savings. The FDIC argued that the general rule of
imputation should not be applied due to the FDIC's special status of succes-
sor to the FSLIC as receiver of City Savings and Lamar Savings. Relying on
FDIC V Ernst and Young, 362 the court held that "[T]he FDIC is not enti-
355. 760 S.W.2d 642, 646 (Tex. 1988).
356. Shrader, 991 F.2d at 221 (citing Willis, 760 S.W.2d at 646).
357. Id.
358. Id. at 221 (citing Willis, 760 S.W.2d at 646).
359. No. Civ. A. A-88-CA-183 (W.D. Tex.).
360. Shrader, 991 F.2d at 221 (citing Lamar Fin. Corp. v. Adams, No. Civ. A. A-88-CA-
183 (W.D. Tex.)).
361. Shrader, 991 F.2d at 222.
362. 967 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. 1992).
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tied to special protection when it brings a tort claim against a third party on
behalf of a defunct financial entity.1 363 The FDIC attempted to distinguish
itself from Ernst and Young by arguing that in this case it was suing on
behalf of depositors and other creditors, not just on behalf of the failed insti-
tutions. The court held that Ernst and Young was indistinguishable from
this case noting that "'the FDIC does not cite any statutory authority af-
fording it special protection'. . . the FDIC has not pled or offered summary
judgment evidence that City [Savings'] or Lamar Savings' depositors and
other creditors were clients of Shrader & York and thus able to sue Shrader
& York for professional malpractice."'364 The court noted that under Texas
law an attorney can be held liable for professional malpractice only to a
person with whom the attorney has privity, meaning that person must be a
client.365 The FDIC did not explain how its position would be improved by
standing in the shoes of depositors or other creditors. The court reasoned
that because the knowledge of Adams was imputed to City Savings and La-
mar Savings, the FSLIC had acquired stale claims against Shrader & York
when it was appointed receiver of City Savings and Lamar Savings.
The FDIC also contended that Adams' knowledge should not be imputed
to City Savings or Lamar Savings because Adams acted adversely to the
interests of City Savings and Lamar Savings. The FDIC relied upon the
general rule that a bank officer's or director's knowledge will generally not
be imputed to the bank if the officer or director acts with an interest adverse
to the bank. 366 Relying on Goldstein v. Union Nat'l Bank,367 Ernst and
Young3 6 8 and Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman,369 the court stated that "to
successfully establish that Adams' knowledge of the fraudulent activity was
not imputed to the corporation under the discovery rule, the FDIC would
have to prove that Adams acted adversely to or committed fraud against
City [Savings] and/or Lamar [Savings]." ' 370 Upon a review of the transac-
tions, the court noted that the FDIC did not offer evidence that Adams per-
sonally profited from the transactions at Lamar Savings' expense nor did
actions taken due to Adams' desire to maintain control over City Savings'
and Lamar Savings, bring Adams' conduct within the adverse interest
exception.
Finally, the FDIC argued that Adams adversely dominated City Savings
and Lamar Savings; therefore, the causes of action against Shrader & York
by City Savings and Lamar Savings did not begin to run until Adams was
not longer in control of the institutions. The FDIC argued that the adverse
domination theory should be applicable because Adams prevented City Sav-
ings and Lamar Savings from suing Shrader & York in order to avoid expo-
363. Shrader, 991 F.2d at 222 (citing Ernst and Young, 967 F.2d at 170).
364. Id. at 223.
365. See First Min. Leasing v. Blankenship, Potts, 648 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
366. Shrader, 991 F.2d at 223; see FDIC v. Lott, 460 F.2d 82, 88 (5th Cir. 1972).
367. 109 Tex. 555, 213 S.W. 584, 590-91 (1919).
368. 967 F.2d at 171.
369. 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880, (1982).
370. Shrader, 991 F.2d at 224.
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sure of his own wrongdoing. The court rejected this argument noting that
no cases from Texas or the Fifth Circuit court had been produced by the
FDIC extending the adverse domination doctrine beyond corporate officers
and directors.
2. Federal v. State Statute of Limitations
Until very recently, an unsettled question existed concerning whether the
federal six-year or the Texas four-year statute of limitations period is appli-
cable when an instrument is transferred by the FDIC to an assignee or
holder, and that assignee or holder subsequently brings suit on the instru-
ment.3 7 ' The Texas Supreme Court has now resolved this issue and has held
that the Federal six-year statute of limitation period is applicable. The
Texas Supreme Court had granted writs to review two cases which arrived at
opposite conclusions. 372 Basically, Thweatt v. Jackson concluded that the
rights of a transferee in an instrument are the same as the rights of a trans-
feror-and where the FDIC is the transferor-these rights include the bene-
fit of the federal statute of limitations under section 1821(d)(14) .373 The
Weatherly court declined to follow Thweatt, concluding that the inherent
nature of a statute of limitations is to limit the substantive right to bring a
claim and is not a "right" in and of itself.3 74 While the Texas Supreme
Court was deliberating the merits of Thweatt and Weatherly, another state
case came out in support of Thweatt.375
As for the federal courts, the Fifth Circuit, in FDIC v. Bledsoe, deter-
mined that an assignee is entitled to the six-year statute based on the reason-
ing used in Thweatt that an assignee stands in the shoes of an assignor and
that the federal statute does not prohibit an assignee from receiving the bene-
fit of the six-year period.376 The Bledsoe court also noted that the federal
district courts which have considered this issue have unanimously found that
an assignee of the FDIC receives the benefit of the federal six-year statute.377
Subsequently, the Texas Supreme Court issued its opinion in Jackson,
which expressly affirmed Thweatt and reversed Weatherly. There it held that
the assignee of a note from the FDIC "receives the full rights of the as-
371. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14) (Supp. 1 1989) (Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act) ("FIRREA"); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004(a)(3)
(Vernon 1986).
372. See Federal Debt Management, Inc. v. Weatherly, 842 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. App.-Dal-
las 1992, writ granted) (holding the Texas statute applies); Thweatt v. Jackson, 838 S.W.2d
725 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ granted) (holding the federal statute applies).
373. Thweatt, 838 S.W.2d at 727-28.
374. Weatherly, 842 S.W.2d at 778.
375. See Jon Luce Builder v. First Gibraltar Bank, 849 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. App.-Austin
1993, writ requested) (holding that federal statute of limitations applied to holder of a loan
note acquired after the original noteholder, a savings and loan association, was declared insol-
vent by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation).
376. FDIC v. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d 805, 809-10 (5th Cir. 1993).
377. Id. at 809 (citing North American Consultants v. Garlick Sales, No. CIV-91-1066-C,
1992 WL 477016 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 20, 1992); Mountain States Fin. Resources Corp. v.
Agrawal, 777 F. Supp. 1550 (W.D. Okla. 1991); Fall v. Keasler, No. C-90-2-643-SW (ARB),
1991 WL 340182 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1991)).
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signor," under Texas common law.378 These rights include the benefit of the
federal six-year statute of limitations.3 79 In so holding, the Jackson court
rejected the argument that an assignee can receive only common law rights
and not those rights which arise by statute such as an extended limitations
period. The court held that a federal statute may be interpreted according to
federal common law especially when, as in this area, a whole body of federal
common law has grown up concerning the interpretation of this federal stat-
ute.380 Furthermore, although the court had previously held that a statute
of limitations does not confer a "right," the court now ruled that such a
statute does confer a "right" where it is used as a sword rather than as shield
to block a claim. 31 Finally, the court ruled that the limitations period
under section 1821(d)(14) as part of FIRREA applies retroactively to claims
in existence prior to the date of FIRREA's enactment on August 9, 1989.382
In so ruling, the could suggested that the only instance in which the state's
four-year period would apply would be when the claim was already stale
under that statute prior to the appointment of the FDIC as a receiver. 383 Of
course, this limited exception is well recognized. 384 Therefore, the practical
effect of the Texas Supreme Court's decision is to confer upon the assignee of
a claim from the FDIC the full federal six-year limitations period. This deci-
sion should provide much needed comfort to those financial institutions
which assumed claims, the enforcement of which appeared highly questiona-
ble if the Texas four-year statute was applicable.385
On a closely related issue, a Texas court has held that the federal six-year
statute is not available to banks which were created through a reorganization
with the financial assistance of the FDIC but were never in a conservator-
ship or receivership with the FDIC.386 The banks argued that the "open
bank assistance transaction" which created them was in substance a receiv-
ership, thus making them successors to the FDIC, and as such, they would
be entitled to the six-year statute.387 The court did not consider the issue of
whether successors or assignees Would be entitled to the six-year statute,
because it found, based on its opinion in City of Houston v. First City,388 that
the banks were not successors to the FDIC. In that case, the court deter-
mined that the FDIC's relationship to the banks was only as a lender. 389
Furthermore, the Bank could not be a de facto receiver because receivership
is a specific legal status, requiring a determination by the Comptroller of the
378. Jackson v. Thweatt, 1994 WL 70405, at *2.
379. Id.
380. Id. at *3.
381. Id.
382. Id. at *5.
383. Id.
384. See FDIC v. Belli, 981 F.2d 838, 842 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that a special federal
limitation provision will not revive a claim already barred under state law).
385. Jackson v. Thweatt, 1994 WL 80405 at *2.
386. Prince v. First City Texas-Houston, N.A., 853 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1993, no writ).
387. Id. at 694.
388. 827 S.W.2d 462 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
389. Id. at 478.
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Currency and the appointment of a receiver, and none of these requirements
had been met.390
In FDIC v. Fuller391 the court determined that either under Fifth Circuit
or Texas law, laches is generally not available as a defense by a debtor
against a lender in a contract action. 392 In Fuller the FDIC had filed its
claim within the applicable statute of limitations but the debtor argued that
because of the FDIC's undue delay in filing the claim, it should be barred by
the equitable doctrine of laches.393 The court found that in legal actions,
including the case at hand, equitable remedies such as laches are not avail-
able.394 The court noted that there exists an exception to this rule in some
jurisdictions (although not yet recognized in the Fifth Circuit or in Texas)
for "extraordinary circumstances" where laches can be asserted even though
the applicable statute of limitations has not yet run.395 The court questioned
the efficacy of the rule because "it does not admit principled limits," but did
not reject the rule because even if the exception were recognized, no "ex-
traordinary circumstances" existed in this case. 396 A Texas federal district
court, on the other hand, has stated without exception that where "there is
an applicable statute of limitations period ... laches is unavailable. '3 97
3. Sales of Annuity Contracts
On March 20, 1990, the Comptroller of the Currency issued an opinion
letter authorizing national banks to sell annuity contracts. 398 The letter con-
cluded that 12 U.S.C. § 92, which permitted national banks to act as insur-
ance agents in towns with less than 5,000 inhabitants, did not prohibit
national banks from selling insurance in towns with more than 5,000 in-
habitants, and, in any event, annuities are not a form of insurance.399
Although some doubt existed over the continued validity of section 92, the
390. Id.
391. 994 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1993).





397. FDIC v. Spain, 796 F. Supp. 241, 243 (W.D. Tex. 1992).
398. See Unpublished OCC Interpretive Letter, Mar. 20, 1990, available in LEXIS,
BANKING Library, OCCUL File.
399. Clarke, 998 F.2d at 1296. Section 92 provides in relevant part that national banks,
located and doing business in any place the population of which does not exceed
five thousand inhabitants, as shown by the last preceding decennial census, may,
under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Comptroller of the
Currency, act as the agent for any fire, life, or other insurance company author-
ized by the authorities of the State in which such bank is located to do business
in such state, by soliciting and selling insurance and collecting premiums on
policies issued by such company....
Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 461, 39 Stat. 753 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1926)). The 1952 edition
of the U.S.C. omitted this provision and added a note explaining that Congress had repealed it
in 1918. 12 U.S.C. § 92 note (1952). Although successive editions of the U.S.C. have all
carried over the same note, both Congress and the courts have on occasion acted as if section
92 has remained in force. See United States Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents
of America, Inc. 113 S. Ct. 2173, 2176 (1993).
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Supreme Court subsequently ruled that it was still good law.4°W
The Fifth Circuit has now held that section 92 prohibits a national bank
from selling annuities in towns with more than 5,000 inhabitants.4 0 1 The
court first determined, based on Saxon v. Georgia Association of Independent
Insurance Agents, 4° 2 that section 92 "authorizes national banks in towns
with a population smaller than 5,000 to act as insurance agents, and im-
pliedly prohibits national banks in towns with a population larger than 5,000
from acting as insurance agents."'4 0 3 The court rejected the argument that
the Comptroller's interpretation should be respected under Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. ,44 which requires due defer-
ence to be given to an administrative agency's statutory interpretation. The
court concluded that "deference under Chevron does not permit administra-
tive agencies to overrule precedents." 4° 5 The court then determined that
annuities are an insurance product both because historically they have been
a product of insurance companies and have been regulated by the states
under their insurance laws; and because functionally they "are the mirror
image of life insurance" and, just as an insurance policy, "are formulated on
the basis of actuarial calculations of mortality risk," and involve a transfer of
risk.406 The court then concluded that since section 92 prohibits national
banks from selling annuities in towns with a population larger than 5,000
inhabitants, the opinion letter issued by the Comptroller was in violation of
this section. 4° 7
4. Choice of Remedies
In Douglas v. NCNB Texas National Bank 408 the court held that a Texas
lender need not file a counterclaim against a borrower to collect on the col-
lateral for a loan, even if the borrower has sued the lender contesting the
loan's validity.40 9 In Douglas, the borrowers on two promissory notes,
Douglas Drilling, Inc., and Donald W. Douglas, contended that the FDIC
could not collect on the notes because the prior holder, First RepublicBank
Abilene, N.A. (FRBA), had lost its right to collect on the notes by failing to
counterclaim to collect on the overdue notes in prior litigation. 4 10 This prior
litigation was instituted by the borrowers and then dismissed in federal court
with prejudice based on their motion. After this litigation, FRBA assigned
400. Bank of Oregon, 113 S. Ct. at 2187.
401. Clarke, 998 F.2d at 1295.
402. 399 F.2d 1010, 1012 (5th Cir. 1968).
403. Clarke, 998 F.2d at 1298.
404. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
405. Clarke, 998 F.2d at 1300.
406. Id. at 1300-01.
407. Id. at 1303.
408. 979 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 68 (1993).
409. Id. at 1130-31.
410. This argument was based on Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides that a counterclaim is compulsory if it arises out of the transaction or occur-
rence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) and Douglas, 979
F.2d at 1129. Id.
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the two notes to the FDIC which subsequently brought suit in federal court
to enforce the notes.
The Fifth Circuit found that in the prior litigation FRBA was not re-
quired to file a compulsory counterclaim because although the claims might
fall within the purview of the compulsory counterclaim rule contained in
Federal Rule 13(a), to so hold would violate the Rules Enabling Act.41'
This act provides that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."'412 The court reasoned
that here, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 97(a) "does not require the se-
cured party to counterclaim to collect on the debt if the creditor has a con-
tractual right to pursue a nonjudicial foreclosure. ' 41 3 If the court required,
under the federal rules, that the FRBA must file a compulsory counterclaim,
then it would deprive FRBA of its "substantive right [under Texas law] to
elect judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure in the event of a default, and debtors
have no right to force the lender to pursue a judicial foreclosure remedy. ' 414
Therefore, FRBA was not required to file as a compulsory counterclaim its
claim to collect the amounts owed under the notes, and the FDIC, as a
holder in due course, could assert this claim.415 This decision prevents debt-
ors from using a federal forum to accomplish what they cannot do in a state
forum - delay foreclosure by forcing the creditor to use the judicial process.
5. Novation
In FDIC v. Waggoner 41 6 the court had to decide, inter alia, whether under
Texas law, a note which consolidated a debtor's previous nonrecourse notes
was a novation so that the renewal and extension of the original notes ren-
dered the debtor personally liable under the new note. Here, the debtor orig-
inally entered into two nonrecourse notes which affirmatively rejected
personal liability. These notes were subsequently combined into one consoli-
dated note, which recited that it was a renewal and extension of the original
notes but was silent as to personal liability.
The court determined that the debtor could only be personally liable
under the new note "if the parties intended a novation of the debts evidenced
by the first two notes."'417 Of the elements for a novation, the only one in
doubt was whether there was "the extinguishment of the old contract. '41 8
Extinguishment of the old note must be based on the intention of the parties,
and the burden of proof is on the party seeking the novation.419 The court
411. Douglas, 979 F.2d at 1130.
412. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988).
413. Douglas, 979 F.2d at 1130.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 1131.
416. 999 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1993).
417. Id. at 829.
418. Id. The elements of a novation are: "(1) a previous, valid obligation; (2) an agree-
ment of the parties to a new contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old contract; and (4) the
validity of the new contract." Id. The parties agreed that elements one, two, and four existed




concluded that although a novation may arise from inconsistencies in the
two contracts, such was not the case here since much of the language in the
consolidated note was taken verbatim from the original notes and the consol-
idated note did not involve any new money, or even a change in interest
rate.420 Furthermore, the bank waited over two years after default before
attempting to collect personally from the debtor even though the collateral
was inadequate. The court found that this action evidenced the existence of
an agreement not to change the debtor's status concerning his personal lia-
bility. 421 Therefore, the bank failed to prove that a novation occurred.
II. LEGISLATION
A. BANKRUPTCY AND BANK LIQUIDATIONS
1. Liquidation Priorities
The legislature adopted an amendment to Articles 342-804 of the Texas
Banking Code of 1943, as amended (the Banking Code),422 which gives the
claims against a state bank the same priority as claims against a national
bank. This amendment abolishes the "depositor preference statute" which
was enacted in 1985 at the behest of the FDIC. 423 The original statute pro-
vided a priority list of payouts to uninsured claimants which facilitated the
FDIC's ability to enter into purchase and assumption transactions as op-
posed to straight insurance payouts of failed banks.424 However, the FDIC
no longer enters into purchase and assumption transactions because it has
interpreted later enacted federal legislation to require it to structure closed-
bank transactions so that they do not cover uninsured depositors. 425 This
change in policy resulted in significant discrimination against state banks,
when, in connection with the First City failure, the FDIC paid the claims of
institutions which had sold Fed funds to national banks but did not pay the
claims of institutions which had sold Fed funds to state chartered banks.
The FDIC based its differential treatment on Texas's "depositor preference
statute". 426 This precedent-setting action threatened the state-federal dual
banking system because it now placed "all state chartered banks at a com-
petitive disadvantage to national banks especially regarding their participa-
tion in certain types of liquidity transactions necessary to conducting normal
business. ' 427 To solve this disparity, the new law, as promulgated by Senate
Bill No. 238, provides that claims for payment against a state bank have the
420. Id. at 829-30.
421. Id. at 830.
422. TEX. CiV. STAT. ANN. arts. 342-804a (Vernon Supp. 1994).
423. See TEX. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-804a (Vernon Supp. 1993); Senate Comm. on Inv.
and Banking, BILL ANALYSIS 1, Tex. S.B. 238, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (hereinafter BILL ANAL-
Ysis S.B. 238).
424. See TEXAS BANKERS ASS'N, SUMMARY OF LAWS AFFECTING BANKS ENACTED BY
THE 73RD LEGISLATURE 7 (1993) (hereinafter SUMMARY).
425. Bill Analysis S.B. 238 at 1.
426. See KAREN NEELY, WHITE PAPER 6 (Indep. Bankers Ass'n of Texas 1993) (hereinaf-
ter WHITE PAPER).
427. BILL ANALYSIS S.B. 238 at 2.
1994]
SMU LAW REVIEW
same priority that similar claims would have against a national bank. 428 As
an aside, Congress is considering a bill that would impose a national "depos-
itor preference," thereby allowing the FDIC to act to the equal detriment of
both national and state chartered banks.429
2. Exemption Concerning Personal Property in Bankruptcy
House Bill No. 1828430 amends the Texas Property Code to make clear
that although a lien or encumbrance may be placed on exempt personal
property, such a "security interest or lien may not be avoided on the ground
that the property is exempt. . . . ,431 This change was enacted in response to
Owen v. Owen. 432 In Owen the Supreme Court held that section 522(0 of the
Federal Bankruptcy Code433 allows debtors to avoid any nonpossessory,
nonpurchase money lien on otherwise exempt property.4 34 Therefore, under
this holding, a bankruptcy court must "ask first whether avoiding the lien
would entitle the debtor to an exemption, and if it would, then avoid and
recover the lien. . . .,435 Therefore, under the Owens ruling any security
interest based on potentially exempt personal property could be voided by
the bankruptcy court. The result is particularly troublesome for agricultural
lenders who can no longer protect themselves on liens secured by farm
equipment and vehicles. 436 The same is true for lenders to sole proprietors
who offer their tools of trade as security.4 37 The new state law attempts to
cure this problem by clearly stating that such security interests cannot be
discharged in bankruptcy. However, because the Owen court was interpret-
ing federal law, this new change will not be effective until the United States
Bankruptcy Code is amended.4 38 Therefore, lenders should be wary of mak-
ing loans based on such security, especially since the current family personal
property exemption is $60,000. 4 3 9
428. Id.
429. WHITE PAPER at 6.
430. Codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
431. Id.
432. 111 S. Ct. 1833 (1991); see also HOUSE COMM. ON BUSINESS AND INDUS., BILL
ANALYSIS 1, Tex. H.B. 1828, 73d Leg. R.S. (1993) (hereinafter BILL ANALYSIS H.B. 1828).
433. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(0.
434. 111 S. Ct. at 1837. Section 522(0 applies regardless of whether a debtor choose fed-
eral or state exemptions. This law provides in pertinent part:
(f) Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing
of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien
impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under sub-
section (b) of this section, if such lien is-
(1) a judicial lien; or
(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest ....
11 U.S.C. § 522(0 (1988).
435. Owen, III S. Ct. at 1837-38.
436. BILL ANALYSIS H.B. 1828 at 1.
437. Id.
438. See id. at 2.
439. See WHITE PAPER at 18.
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B. LEVY ON DEPOSIT BOXES
The Comptroller may freeze and levy for the collection of delinquent taxes
upon certain assets of a debtor which are in the possession of a financial
institution.440 However, under prior law, safety deposit boxes and their con-
tents were not subject to such forfeiture. This caused some concern, espe-
cially regarding the ability of the Comptroller to collect controlled
substances taxes.44 With the passage of House Bill No. 365, the legislature
has amended the Tax Code to specifically include safety deposit boxes as
assets subject to the Comptroller's levy powers.442 The bill also provides
that the Comptroller shall issue regulations "relating to inventory of the box
contents, delivery of the contents, and reimbursement to the financial institu-
tion or other safe deposit box facility for drilling and other costs." 443
C. GOVERNMENT DEPOSITS
1. Municipal Depositories
In the past session, the Texas Legislature significantly revised the munici-
pal depository law. 4" The prior laws governing public funds had not been
amended since the 1930s, so this major overhaul was an attempt to reflect
the vast changes in technology and financial services that had occurred since
that time.445 Although numerous changes were enacted greatly enhancing
the business opportunities for banks in dealing with municipalities, perhaps
the most significant change was the inclusion of credit unions and savings
and loans as permissible depositories for municipal funds.446
This change, as well as others in the new law, was enacted to give munici-
palities greater flexibility in managing their funds. In this respect, the law
expressly allows municipalities to obtain bids from a variety of institu-
tions.447 Also, municipalities may award their business to more than one
financial institution. 4 8 Eligible institutions can include those that do not do
business within the municipality, if the municipality has a prior written pol-
icy expressly permitting such a selection and the policy requires the explicit
consideration of the municipality's best interests.4 9 In addition, municipali-
ties may contract for a range of other financial services besides deposits. 450
440. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.021 (Vernon 1992).
441. See HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM., BILL ANALYSIS 1, Tex H.B. 365, 73d Leg.,
R.S. (1993) (hereinafter BILL ANALYSIS H.B. 365).
442. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.021(j) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
443. Id.
444. See Tex. H.B. 696, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993).
445. HOUSE COMM. ON INV. AND BANKING, BILL ANALYSIS 1, Tex. H.B. 696, 73d Leg.,
R.S. (1993) (hereinafter BILL ANALYSIS H.B. 696).
446. See TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 105.001(4) (Vernon Supp. 1994). The new law
also allows a savings and loan to be a depository for counties and school districts. See TEX.
Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 116.001(1) (Vernon Supp. 1994); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 23.73(2) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
447. BILL ANALYSIS H.B. 696 at 2.
448. TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 105.015 (Vernon Supp 1994).
449. Id. § 105.01 l(b)(2).
450. Id. § 105.018.
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These other services may include investments in accordance with the munic-
ipality's investment policy and investments in certificates of deposit. 451 A
municipality may enter into a deposit with an institution for a period not to
exceed five years instead of being limited to a yearly renewal. 452 Further-
more, a municipality may negotiate the terms and conditions relating to pos-
session, release, or substitution of security. 45 3 In this respect, the new law
has repealed the specific list of acceptable security for deposits and instead
references the Public Funds Collateral Act at article 2529d of the Texas
Civil Statute.454 Given this vastly increased negotiating power with a wide
array of financial institutions, municipalities can be expected to become
much more savvy and demanding customers, and banks must be prepared to
provide them with the highest level of service and expertise-especially with
the additional increase in competition from credit unions and savings and
loans.
2. Linked State Fund Deposits
In an attempt to "stimulate the economy," 4 55 the legislature has enacted a
law providing that the state will deposit its funds into banks which enter into
loans with "historically underutilized businesses" and businesses located in
"distressed communities. ' ' 45 6 Basically, this scheme provides that banks
which make loans to minority-owned businesses or to businesses in poverty-
stricken areas will be eligible to have state funds, not to exceed three million
dollars, deposited in them.4 57 The bank must submit each proposed loan
application for approval to the Department of Commerce (the "Depart-
ment") which may decide whether to accept or reject the application. 458
The statute provides no guidelines for acceptance or rejection of an applica-
tion and apparently the Department is foreseen as having "broad rulemaking
authority" in establishing such guidelines. 459 However, once the Depart-
ment accepts an application and the bank makes the loan, it "shall place a
linked deposit" with the bank.460 Also, no minimum amount or minimum
period for the deposit is specified, and presumably, is at the discretion of the
Department. 46 1 Until the Department promulgates its rules outlining its cri-
451. Id. § 105.071.
452. Id. § 105.017.
453. Id. § 105.05 1.
454. Id. § 105.034(a)(5).
455. HOUSE COMM. ON INV. AND BANKING, BILL ANALYSIS 1, Tex. C.S.H.B. 259, 73d
Leg., R.S. (1993) (hereinafter BILL ANALYSIS C.S.H.B. 259).
456. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 481.191 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
457. Id. §§ 481.193, 481.197.
458. Id. § 481.193(0.
459. BILL ANALYSIS C.S.H.B. 259 at 1.
460. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 481.193(g) (Vernon Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
461, Elsewhere in the statute, the maximum eligible linked-deposit loan amount is specified
as $100,000. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 481.197(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994). This limit seems to
imply that the statute envisions a dollar-for-dollar state fund deposit for an accepted loan-
application amount. However, nowhere in the statute is this connection explicitly made. In
any event, nothing in the statute, either explicitly or implicitly, prevents the Department from
making a deposit one day and withdrawing it the next day.
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teria for accepting loan applications and for establishing minimum deposits
and time periods, it would be inadvisable for banks to make such loans based
on the expectation of receiving this benefit.
The legislature also extended the link-fund deposit program to include
loans made to borrowers producing agricultural crops in Texas: (1) who
have experienced a marked decline "because of natural disasters," or (2) who
use "water conservation equipment for agricultural production
purposes. 46
2
D. UNIFORM PROVISIONS: PERSONALTY LEASES AND
WIRE TRANSFERS
House Bill No. 1113 amended several sections of the Texas Business and
Commerce Code by, inter alia, adopting two chapters of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (UCC) thereby adding a Chapter 2A to the UCC regarding
personal property leases and a Chapter 4A to the UCC concerning wire
transfers. 463 A full explanation of these chapters is beyond the scope of this
summary, so a brief overview will have to suffice.
1. Personal Property Leases
Chapter 2A prescribes the rights, obligations, and remedies for parties
that enter into a personal property lease. Of particular interest to creditors,
these provisions include detailed rules concerning alienability of a party's
interest under the lease, sale or sublease of goods by lessee, priority of liens,
and special rights of creditors.464 This chapter also delineates a wide range
of remedies for the lessee and lessor which are similar to the UCC's remedies
for a breach of contract. 465 Although many of these rules leave the law in
this area unchanged, because this new statute is a wholesale revision and
includes many new clarifications and additions, creditors should thoroughly
review this statute in order to make any needed modifications in their cur-
rent forms and practices concerning personal property leases.
2. Electronic Wire Transfers
Chapter 4A provides a comprehensive system for regulating electronic
wire transfers, described as "payment orders" in the chapter. This chapter
was passed with the intent of providing a "fast, inexpensive and reliable"
transaction in this area.466 In order to assure the rapid movement of funds
through electronic systems, the new law provides that if a bank fails to ac-
cept an order that it is required by contract to accept, then it is liable for
breach of contract. 467 Also, in order to keep such orders inexpensive, conse-
462. TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 44.001(3) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
463. See generally TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. ch. 2A, ch. 4A (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
Supp. 1994).
464. See id. §§ 2A.303, 2A.305, 2A.306, 2A.307, and 2A.308.
465. See id. § 2A.508 et. seq., § 2A.523 et. seq.
466. HouSE COMM. ON BUSINESS AND INDUS. BILL ANALYSIS 6, Tex. H.B. 1113, 73d
Leg., R.S. (1993) (hereinafter BILL ANALYSIS H.B. 1113).
467. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 4A.207, 4A.208, 4A.209 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
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quential damages are generally barred under this statute unless expressly
contracted for.468 Finally, such transactions are made more reliable by allo-
cating losses to banks when there are mistakes in execution of the orders.
469
Again, a lender should become thoroughly familiar with this statute's
provisions.
E. CHOICE OF LAW CONTRACT PROVISIONS
House Bill No. 1113, previously discussed, amended the Business and
Commerce Code to allow parties who enter into business transactions in-
volving $1 million or more the ability to stipulate in writing that their agree-
ment will be governed by the law of a particular jurisdiction.470 For
purposes of this section, a transaction is defined to include "more than one
substantially similar or related transaction entered into contemporaneously
and having at least one common party."'471 In general, the parties' choice of
law concerning validity and enforceability of the contract will be upheld-
even if the law chosen is contrary to the fundamental or public policy of
Texas-as long as the jurisdiction chosen bears a "reasonable relation" to
the transaction. 472 As for the interpretation or construction of the contract,
the law of the jurisdiction chosen need not be reasonably related to the trans-
action. 473 The new law includes a laundry list of factors for determining
"reasonable relation."'474 It also includes a fail-safe clause where if the cho-
sen jurisdiction's law would disallow a provision of the contract, that juris-
diction's law is inapplicable as to that provision, and one then looks to the
law which has the most significant relation to the transaction. 475 This provi-
sion is based on the principle that parties should be held to the terms of their
agreement and is implemented to eliminate the results in cases such as Fore-
man v. George Foreman Associates, Ltd. ,476 where the provisions of a con-
tract were rendered unenforceable when the law specifically chosen by the
parties required that such provisions be rendered unenforceable. 477 This
statute does not apply to certain transactions such as those concerned with
real property, marriage, adoption, wills and estates, or transactions which
are covered by another state or federal statute which stipulates the choice of
law.478
468. See id. § 4A.305(b)-(c).
469. BILL ANALYSIS H.B. 1113 at 6.
470. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.51 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
471. Id. § 35.51(a)(1).
472. Id. § 35.5 1(b).
473. Id. § 35.51(c).
474. Id. § 35.51(d).
475. Id. § 35.51(e).
476. 517 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1975).
477. BILL ANALYSIS H.B. 1113 at 9.
478. TEX. Bus. & COM CODE ANN. § 35.51(0 (Vernon Supp. 1994). The bill also
amended the code to provide that a choice of law provision in a construction contract to be
performed in Texas is voidable by the obligated party to perform the construction or repair if




House Bill No. 1113, previously discussed, repealed Chapter 6 of the
Texas Business and Commerce Code concerning bulk sales. Such a repeal
was implemented based on the professed reasoning that "[m]odern commer-
cial and legal reality no longer supports the need for regulation of bulk sales
transactions;" and "[t]he benefits to creditors no longer justify the costs to
society of interfering with good faith bulk sales transactions. '479
G. TEXAS CREDIT CODE
1. Punitive Damages for Material Violations
The legislature adopted several amendments to the Texas Consumer
Credit Code. The most important change-from a lender's standpoint-
amended the amount of damages that can be sought for certain violations of
the Code.480 Before this change, lenders were subject to punitive damages
for highly technical violations in situations where their instruments con-
tained the wrong typeface or lacked certain technical disclosures. 481 Under
the new law promulgated by House Bill No. 813, the prior law's damages
provision which allowed for punitive damages is applicable only if "the vio-
lation was material and the finder of fact determines that the violation in-
duced the obligor to enter into a transaction into which the obligor would
not have entered had the violation not occurred." 482 For technical disclo-
sure violations which are judged immaterial, the new penalty excludes puni-
tive damages and instead is limited to "an amount not to exceed three times
the actual economic loss suffered by the obligor as a result of the violation,
together with reasonable attorneys' fees fixed by the court .... *"483 Many
creditors believe that this law will effectively eliminate punitive damages in
this area since the errors relied on in recent cases would not fall within the
statute's materiality requirements. 484
2. Involuntary Unemployment Credit Insurance
House Bill No. 1598 amended Chapter Three of the Texas Credit Code
regarding regulated loans, so that persons making a loan under this Chapter
may offer involuntary unemployment credit insurance. 485 Lenders under
Chapter Six regarding retail installment contracts, already may offer this
479. BILL ANALYSIS H.B. 1113 at 2.
480. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-8.01 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1994).
481. WHITE PAPER, supra note 428, at 12.
482. TEX. REV. ClV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-8.01(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
483. Id. at art. 5069-8.01(b)(1).
484. WHITE PAPER, supra note 428, at 12.
485. See TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-3.18 (Vernon Supp. 1994). Involuntary
unemployment insurance provides primary coverage for the repayment of a specified number
of monthly payments of a loan or retail credit obligation when the insured involuntarily loses
employment income. This type of insurance has been traditionally sold as group insurance
along with a credit transaction or as credit card outstanding balance protection. See HOUSE
COMM. ON INV. AND BANKING, BILL ANALYSIS 1, Tex. H.B. 1598, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993)
(hereinafter BILL ANALYSIS H.B. 1598).
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type of insurance. 48 6 Now lenders may offer this product for other types of
installment contracts. However, the legislature also amended Chapters
Three and Four of the Credit Code so as to prohibit lenders from requiring
the purchase of involuntary unemployment credit insurance. 48 7 Therefore,
although at first blush, the ability of lenders to offer this insurance should
facilitate lending transactions, the fact that such transactions cannot be
predicated upon the purchase of this insurance leaves in considerable doubt
its utility.
3. Collateral Protection Insurance
House Bill No. 1598 also amends Chapter Two to require that lenders
who demand collateral protection insurance must provide written notice to
the borrower-at the borrower's expense-describing the type of insurance
procured, the extent of the coverage, who the insurance is designated to pro-
tect, the policy period, the total cost to the borrower, and the rate of interest
to be charged on the insurance premium.488
H. INTERESTS IN DAMAGED RESIDENTIAL REAL PROPERTY
Where a lender has a mortgage, lien, deed, or security interest in a bor-
rower's insured residential real property and that property is damaged re-
sulting in the insurance company making a claim payment, the lender can
directly receive the payment and withhold all or part of it from the insured
borrower.4 89 Under prior law, the lender was not required to remit the in-
surance proceeds or to notify the insured. This was perceived by the legisla-
ture as placing an undue burden on the insured borrower who must pay for
the cost of repairs to the damaged residential property.490 The legislature
adopted an amendment to the Insurance Code which basically requires the
lender to notify the insured borrower no later than the tenth day after the
lender receives the insurance proceeds, and to inform the borrower what
conditions he must fulfill before the lender will release the proceeds. 49 1
Also, if the insured borrower requests the release of the proceeds, within ten
days the lender must either release the funds or notify the borrower why the
funds are not being released. 492 If the lender fails to give notice, then the
lender shall be liable for interest at a rate of ten percent per year on the
insurance proceeds. 493 Interest accrues on the date that the lender receives
the proceeds. 494 Obviously, this law will necessitate that lenders implement
some system to insure compliance with the ten-day notice period.
486. See BILL ANALYSIS H.B. 1598 at 1.
487. See TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-3.18(1), 5069-4.02(t) (Vernon Supp.
1994).
488. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-2.09 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
489. See HOUSE INS. COMM. BILL ANALYSIS 1, Tex. H.B. 113, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993)
(hereinafter BILL ANALYSIS H.B. 113).
490. Id.
491. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.48B (Vernon Supp. 1994).
492. Id. at art. 21.48B, § 2.






In the past session, the legislature has granted some relief to creditors who
have found Chapter One of the Credit Code a "nightmare" regarding the
ability to avoid usury violations, and as a result "have abandoned Texas and
[its] economy entirely. '49 5 House Bill No. 2005 amended the Credit Code to
grant to lenders who have "actually discovered" a usury violation under that
Code, a sixty day grace period during which they have the opportunity to
take whatever actions and to make whatever adjustments are necessary in
order to correct the usury violation.496 The term "actually discovered"
means discovery in fact and the term "may not be construed, interpreted, or
applied in a manner that refers to the time or date when, through reasonable
diligence, an ordinarily prudent person could or should have discovered or
known as a matter of law or fact the violation in question. . . -497 This
statute also includes a one-time all-inclusive grace period which grants per-
sons who have known of usury violations in contracts for more than sixty
days the opportunity to cure those defects before March 1, 1994.498
However, this limited all-purpose grace period may be, for practical pur-
poses, superfluous. If the fairly thorough prohibition against using a date
based on reasonable diligence withstands a court's twisting of the statute's
syntax, then, as a practical matter, this means that the evidence of the date
of actual discovery put forward by the lender will be extremely difficult to
overcome by the obligor. Since this issue will turn on the subjective factor of
knowledge, the obligor will be hard pressed to discover any evidence from
the bank itself which would contradict the bank's evidence concerning the
discovery date.
In fact, a lender could cure a violation that has existed for many years if it
can present some evidence that it has just learned of the violation. This may
not be too difficult, since many recent court cases finding usury violations
concern fairly technical issues such as fees and contingencies-and not bla-
tant violations such as an explicit usurious interest rate. Therefore, it seems
very plausible that a bank would not discover that one of its contracts con-
tains a usury violation--even one entered into years ago-until a court case
ruled that a similar fee or contingency provision was usurious. 499
2. Asset-Backed Securities
A new change to the Texas usury laws should greatly facilitate the ability
of Texas financial institutions and businesses to engage in asset securitiza-
495. HOUSE COMM. ON INV. AND BANKING, BILL ANALYSIS 2, H.B. 2005, 73d Leg., R.S.
(1993) (hereinafter BILL ANALYSIS H.B. 2005).
496. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(4)(A) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
497. Id. at art. 1.06(4)(B).
498. Id. at art. 1.06(4)(C).




tion.5°° Senate Bill No. 551 enacts a technical clarification so that the defini-
tion of "interest" for usury purposes does not include sums paid or passed
through to the holders of asset-backed securities. 50 1 Prior to this enactment,
the Texas usury laws applied to asset securitization which placed Texas fi-
nancial institutions and issuers of such securities at a competitive disadvan-
tage. Furthermore, since such securities are typically issued through a
special corporation or trust, the usury laws also limited the ability of Texas
businesses to serve in this capacity since Texas businesses were limited in
their ability to benefit from the legal fees, trustee fees, and processing fees
associated with these transaction. 50 2 This amendment does not affect inter-
est paid on the underlying asset.
J. DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY
The legislature has enacted a standard statutory form for a durable power
of attorney and the rules governing this form; and has repealed the prior
statutory provisions concerning the durable power of attorney. 50 3 A de-
tailed analysis of this general act is beyond the scope of this Survey, but
briefly, financial institutions should be aware that under this new chapter,
the statute provides that the revocation of the durable power of attorney is
not effective as to a third party until the third party receives actual notice of
the revocation. 504 Also, the third party may require the holder of the dura-
ble power of attorney to execute an affidavit attesting to the fact that at the
time the holder executed the power he did not have actual knowledge of the
termination of the power. 505 Furthermore, the standard form for a statutory
durable power of attorney provides that the third party is indemnified for
any claims that arise based on its reliance on the durable power of
attorney. 506
This act also spells out the limits of a durable power of attorney in specific
transaction areas such as tax, litigation, real property, insurance, family mat-
ters, estate and trust, and banking. Concerning the construction of this
power relating to banking and other financial institution transactions, a
holder of a durable power of attorney may have the power to, inter alia: (1)
continue, modify, or terminate an account; (2) establish, modify, or termi-
nate an account selected by the attorney in fact; (3) hire a safe deposit box;
(4) contract for other services from a financial institution; (5) withdraw by
500. Generally, asset securitization consists of raising funds via the sale of securities backed
by a segregated pool of assets. Typically, such asset pools may consist of credit card receiv-
ables, equipment leases, automobile or boat loans, and commercial or residential mortgages.
See SEN. COMM. ON INV. AND BANKING, BILL ANALYSIS 1, S.B. 551, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993)
(hereinafter BILL ANALYSIS S.B. 551).
501. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.13 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
502. See BILL ANALYSIS S.B. 551 at 1.
503. See Durable Power of Attorney Act, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 49, § 1, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws
102-13 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. ch. XII, § 481-506 (Vernon Supp.
1994)).
504. Id. § 488.
505. Id. § 487.
506. Id. § 490.
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check, money, or property; (6) receive bank statements; (7) enter a safe de-
posit box or vault and add or withdraw its contents; (8) borrow money,
pledge security, and renew or extend debt; (9) engage in transactions con-
cerning negotiable or nonnegotiable paper; (10) receive and act on a sight
draft, warehouse receipt, or other negotiable or nonnegotiable instrument;
(11) apply and receive letters of credit, credit cards, and traveler's checks;
and (12) agree to the extension of time of payment with respect to commer-
cial paper or other financial transactions. 50 7 In other words, there is very
little that a durable power of attorney cannot do concerning transactions
with financial institutions.
K. MULTI-PARTY "CONVENIENCE ACCOUNTS"
In an extensive reworking of the law in this area, well beyond the scope of
this Survey, the legislature amended the Texas Probate Code to update the
law regarding decedent's estates, multiple-party accounts, trusts, and other
relevant areas. The most important changes from a bank's perspective con-
cern the new rules regarding certain multi-party accounts. Under House
Bill No. 1285, the legislature authorized the creation of "convenience ac-
counts."508 This type of account is entirely owned by the named party. As a
result, the convenience party can be the co-signer on the account without
acquiring an ownership interest or having received a gift of the account.
More importantly for the bank, the law completely releases it from liability
for any payment made from the account before it receives notice not to make
payments from the account. 0 9 This immunity includes payments made to
the convenience party after the owner's death but before receiving notice of
the death.5 10 It also extends to payments made to the personal representa-
tive of the deceased owner before service of a court order prohibiting such a
payment. 51' Also, the law includes a uniform single-party or multi-party
account form that can be utilized in its entirety or modified by a financial
institution.5 1 2
507. Id. § 496.
508. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 438A (Vernon Supp. 1994). This exact same section
and statutory language was also passed by the legislature under House Bill No. 1200. Compare
Act of June 19, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 27, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3349 and Act of June
18, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 795, § 1, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3154.
509. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 438A(f) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
510. Id. § 438A(g).
511. Id.
512. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439A (Vernon Supp. 1994).
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